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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relation between accounting method choice and investment by 
US institutional investors in non-US firms.  Such a relation could be driven by two factors.  First, 
“home bias” in US investment could result in preferences for accounting practices familiar to US 
investors.  The use of accounting methods consistent with US GAAP reduces information 
processing costs for US investors, allowing for more thorough analyses and increasing the 
credibility of the financial information.  Second, many sources consider US GAAP to be one of 
the highest quality sets of financial reporting standards in the world.  Thus, US investors likely 
perceive firms that use accounting methods allowed under US GAAP as having higher 
accounting quality.  We find that firms with higher degrees of conformity with US GAAP have 
greater levels of US institutional ownership.  These associations are exhibited in levels and 
changes, and are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables for other determinants 
of institutional investment.  Lead/lag regressions suggest that increases in US GAAP conformity 
attract a higher level of US institutional investment in future periods, but changes in US 
institutional holdings do not lead to changes in accounting methods.  In partition analyses, we 
find that the positive relation between US GAAP conformity and US institutional investment 
holds regardless of a firm’s ADR status or other proxies for visibility (e.g., stock index listing, 
analyst following, and firm size).  However, the relation is significantly stronger in the 
subsamples of ADR firms and more visible firms, suggesting that US GAAP conformity has 
greater impact among firms already somewhat visible to US investors.   
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1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the relation between accounting method choice and investment by 
US institutional investors in non-US firms.  This relation could be driven by at least two factors.  
First, prior research examining the relatively low level of investment made outside of domestic 
markets suggests that informational factors, such as low visibility of the firm to foreign investors 
and lower credibility of the financial information, are a potential source of this “home bias” 
(Ahearne, et al. [forthcoming], Suh [2001]).  As a primary source of information regarding the 
firm, the accounting system impacts how outsiders perceive and use the firm’s financial 
information.  Greater conformity with accounting practices familiar to foreign investors reduces 
information processing costs, which allows for more thorough analyses and thus increases the 
credibility of the financial information (Barth et al. [1997], Sunder [2002]).   Second, many 
sources consider US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to be one of the highest 
quality sets of financial reporting standards in the world (Dye and Sunder [2001], Ashbaugh and 
Davis-Friday [2002], Bradshaw and Miller [2003], Krishnan [2003]).  Thus, it is likely that 
investors, particularly those from the US, perceive firms that use a large number of accounting 
methods allowed under US GAAP as having higher accounting quality.  Based on these two 
factors, we predict that US institutional investors exhibit a preference for firms using accounting 
methods that conform to US GAAP.  
We find a higher level of US institutional ownership in non-US firms that use a greater 
number of accounting methods that conform to US GAAP.  This association exists in both levels 
and changes.  We partition the sample based on the visibility of the firm to US investors (e.g., 
ADR cross-listing) and find that the association holds regardless of firm visibility, but is 
significantly stronger for more visible firms.  Lead/lag regressions provide evidence that 
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increases in conformity with US GAAP are positively associated with future increases in US 
institutional investment, but changes in US institutional ownership do not lead to changes in 
accounting methods.   
We collect data on accounting method choices for non-US firms from the Worldscope 
database.   We examine the 13 accounting choices identified by Bradshaw and Miller [2003] as 
having some options allowed under US GAAP and some not.  Note that we are interested in 
choices made within the set of permissible local standards that also conform to US GAAP, rather 
than the complete adoption of US GAAP.  We compute a “US GAAP conformity ratio” as the 
fraction of accounting choices that conform to US GAAP.  To ensure that our results are not 
driven by lack of disclosure, we compute the conformity ratios based both on the total number of 
choices and on the number of disclosed choices.  Because flexibility in accounting choices varies 
across countries, we adjust individual firm ratios by the median level for the firm’s country. 
We use the Spectrum database to identify US institutional investment in non-US firms.  
We focus our analysis on institutional investors because they are less likely than retail investors 
to be impacted by any institutional frictions that inhibit international investing.   Further, US 
institutions have become the largest source of capital in the world, extensive data exists on their 
holdings in non-US firms and, as sophisticated investors, they are the class of US investors most 
likely to base their investment decisions on a detailed analysis of financial statements.  We 
measure US institutional investment in three ways: (i) an indicator variable for the existence of 
any investment, (ii) the log of the number of institutional owners, and (iii) the percentage of 
ownership by institutions.  We also country-adjust these variables and all control variables to 
ensure that country-specific factors do not drive the results.  Thus, our analyses examine within-
country relations between accounting choice and US investment in non-US firms.   
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We use cross-sectional levels and contemporaneous changes analyses to examine the 
relation between conformity with US GAAP and US institutional holdings in the firm.  In all 
specifications, we find a significant positive association between the US GAAP conformity 
ratios and investment by US institutions.  For contemporaneous changes, we find that increases 
in the conformity ratios are associated with increases in US investment, but decreases in 
conformity are unrelated to changes in investment.  This result suggests that US GAAP 
conformity is an important factor in choosing to invest in a firm, but once a US institution has 
invested in, and developed a familiarity with, a non-US firm, its sales decisions are based on 
factors other than accounting choice, such as firm performance metrics.  We also estimate 
lead/lag regressions to investigate the causality of the association.  We provide evidence that 
increases in conformity with US GAAP lead to future increases in US institutional ownership, 
consistent with the results for contemporaneous changes, but that changes in US institutional 
ownership do not have an impact on future conformity with US GAAP.  Finally, we confirm that 
all of these results hold with industry-adjustments and with country fixed-effects models. 
Clearly, for accounting choice to impact investment, potential investors must first be 
interested enough in the firm to analyze the company’s financial statements.  Prior research 
indicates that one of the primary causes of the home bias phenomenon is the inability of many 
foreign firms to attract the initial attention of investors.  Proxies for greater firm visibility, such 
as firm size, inclusion in a stock index, analyst following, and having an ADR listing, have all 
been shown to increase US investment in a firm (Kang and Stulz [1997], Covrig, et al. [2001], 
Edison and Warnock [2003]).  We examine the impact of each of these items on the association 
between accounting choice and US investment.  We find that each of these visibility attributes 
significantly increases the impact of US GAAP conformity on US investment.  Despite the 
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requirement that cross-listed ADR firms provide a reconciliation of their home-country GAAP to 
US GAAP, we find that listing an ADR and US GAAP conformity act as complements.  
Additionally, we find that US GAAP conformity ratios still have a statistically significant impact 
on US investment for firms lacking these visibility attributes.   
We also examine whether our within-country results are robust to country-level factors 
such as legal tradition (common law versus code law), the level of overall disclosure, the degree 
of statutory flexibility in accounting choices, and earnings quality.  We find that, in every 
partition of these factors, the relation between the level of US institutional ownership and US 
GAAP conformity is significant.  Thus, the within-country association between US investment 
and accounting choices is robust to different levels of these country-level factors. 
Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways.  First, we show that changes in 
accounting methods precede changes in investment, suggesting that accounting choice impacts 
foreign investment decisions.  This is the first study that we are aware of to directly examine this 
relation.  Second, our evidence that diversity in accounting choices reduces international 
investment contributes to the substantial debate regarding the benefits of international 
harmonization of accounting standards.  Our study suggests that reducing this diversity could 
reduce barriers to cross-country investment.  Third, we show that accounting choice has greater 
impact once attention has been drawn to the firm through another mechanism.  While prior 
research attributes most of the informational issues of international underinvestment to a lack of 
knowledge that the firms exists (consistent with Merton [1987]), our results indicate that the 
informational issues that impact international investment choices are multileveled and at least 
partially due to reporting decisions made by the firm’s managers.   
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Our findings and contributions are subject to several caveats.  First, under Rule 13(f), US 
institutions are only required to list holdings in non-US firms that trade as ADRs.  We find that 
many institutions also list holdings in non-US firms that are not traded in the US, but these 
disclosures are voluntary and almost certainly incomplete.  Thus, we cannot determine the 
magnitude of home bias in our sample.  As long as institutions are not strategic in their reporting, 
this incomplete data should add noise, but not bias, to our tests.  To ensure the incomplete 
reporting does not affect our results, we confirm that our results hold in both ADR and non-ADR 
subsamples.  However, if institutions systematically report (omit) investments in firms that use 
(do not use) US GAAP methods, then our results would suggest that US GAAP conformity is 
associated with a reporting bias rather than an investment preference.  Second, our data limits us 
to studying investors in only one country—the US.  Single-country studies are common in the 
international investment literature (e.g., Kang and Stulz [1997] is based completely on Japanese 
data).  Moreover, the US is the most common country studied (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi [1999], 
Ahearne et. al. [forthcoming], Doidge et. al. [forthcoming] and Pinkowitz et. al. [2002]).  
However, it is possible that our results do not generalize to investors in other countries, 
particularly if their local accounting standards are of low quality and our results simply reflect a 
general preference for higher quality standards, like US GAAP.   
In the next section, we motivate our predictions about the relation between accounting 
choice and US investment.  Section 3 provides a description of the sample and variables used in 
the empirical tests and reports descriptive statistics.  Section 4 reports results of our analyses and 
Section 5 provides a summary and conclusion. 
2.  Motivation and hypotheses 
2.1 Accounting choice and home bias 
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 Prior research documents a pervasive “home bias” in investment portfolios, in which 
investors overweight portfolios with firms domiciled in their home countries and underweight 
portfolios with firms located outside of their home countries (French and Poterba [1991], Cooper 
and Kaplanis [1994], Tesar and Werner [1995], Lewis [1999]).  While institutional factors such 
as restrictions on foreign investments account for a portion of the home bias, the literature in this 
area concludes that the majority of the bias stems from informational issues, including lack of 
knowledge that the firm exists, an inability to monitor the firm, and poor quality or low 
credibility of financial information (Kang and Stulz [1997], Ahearne, et al. [forthcoming], 
Covrig, et al. [2001], Suh [2001], Edison and Warnock [2003]).  This home bias indicates that 
non-US firms attract relatively low investment from US institutions.  Given the magnitude of 
capital controlled by US institutions, this lower level of available capital could have economic 
impacts on firms desiring external capital.  For example, firms with fewer foreign investors 
typically face a higher cost of capital because the economy-specific risk is borne primarily by in-
country investors (Foerster and Karolyi [1999], Doidge, et al. [forthcoming]).   
Prior literature finds that international differences in accounting standards are highly 
related to differences in information environments.  For example, market-based tests indicate that 
German firms that prepare financial reports using either US or IAS GAAP, both of which are 
designed to communicate to external stakeholders, have lower information asymmetries than 
firms that prepare their reports using German GAAP (Leuz and Verrecchia [2000]).  Adopting 
US GAAP or IAS also has been shown to make firms more likely to be a target for international 
mergers and acquisitions (Ashbaugh and Davis-Friday [2002]).  In a study of international 
disclosure practices, Hope [2003a] shows that firms providing detailed disclosures of the 
accounting method choices used in preparing their financial statements have more accurate 
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analysts’ forecasts.  These findings suggest that an understanding of the accounting choices 
being employed can assist outsiders in interpreting the firm’s accounting information.   
Foreign investors are likely to find financial information more useful if a firm uses 
accounting methods that are familiar to these investors and discloses those choices prominently.  
Such conformity with foreign practice allows outside investors to use their current expertise to 
analyze and evaluate the accounting information.1  A greater understanding of accounting 
choices underlying financial data reduces informational issues and, thus, could reduce home bias 
frictions among investors familiar with the accounting methods being employed.  
2.2 Accounting Choice and Preferences for Higher Quality Financial Information  
Prior research suggests that institutional investors exhibit a preference for high quality 
financial information when making international investments.  Gillian and Starks [2003] argue 
that the decision by CalPERS to eliminate investments in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand is 
due in part to financial transparency.  Further, Mitton [2002] provides evidence that firms with 
higher quality disclosures were less impacted by the East Asian financial crises, suggesting that 
voluntary disclosures helped to insulate them from concerns regarding their domestic 
institutional structures.  As the accounting system is an important aspect of a firm’s information 
environment, foreign investors likely prefer accounting choices perceived to be high quality. 
Many sources consider US GAAP to be among the highest quality sets of financial 
reporting standards in the world, frequently classifying it as one of the few globally accepted 
accounting standards (Dye and Sunder [2001], Ashbaugh and Davis-Friday [2002], Dechow and 
Schrand [2003], Glaum and Street [2003], Krishnan [2003]).  Additionally, US GAAP is widely 
accepted by non-US exchanges around the world (Bradshaw and Miller [2003]).  Given the high-
                                                 
1 Barth, Clinch and Shibano [1997] make a similar argument when considering the impact of international variation 
in accounting standards.  They provide a model that shows that harmonizing accounting standards will reduce costs 
of acquiring foreign expertise, thus facilitating international investment.  
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quality status accorded to US GAAP, US investors are likely to perceive accounting choices 
allowed under US GAAP as creating higher quality financial statements. 
Practitioner surveys provide anecdotal evidence of such a preference.  Gavin, Anderson 
& Company, an international IR consulting firm, interviewed 48 US portfolio managers, 
analysts, and research associates from 37 different institutions regarding factors that influence 
international investment.  Every investor polled stated that US GAAP is very important or 
important in making investment decisions (Bank of New York [2002]).  Similarly, McKinsey’s 
[2002] survey of factors impacting international investment included the fact that 90% of global 
investors surveyed would prefer one set of global standards.  Among North American 
respondents, 76% favored US GAAP as this standard.2   
Based on the discussion of accounting choice and on home bias in section 2.1 and the 
discussion in this section regarding a preference for quality accounting, we predict that firms 
employing accounting methods that conform more closely to US GAAP will have a higher level 
of investment from US institutions: 
Hypothesis 1: The amount of ownership by US institutional investors in a firm is positively 
associated with the degree of conformity of the firm’s accounting choices with US GAAP.  
 
2.3 Accounting choice, visibility, and ADRs 
While familiar accounting methods can make information more understandable to foreign 
investors, outside investors must first be interested in reviewing the firm’s financial statements 
for accounting to influence investment decisions.  Prior research suggests that firms that list an 
American Depository Receipt (ADR), are included in a stock index, have large analyst 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, while 59% of Latin American respondents favored US GAAP, 78% of Western European and 65% 
of Asian respondents favored IAS.   Similarly, a KPMG survey of European firms found that their assessment of the 
quality of IAS and US GAAP was dependent on the type of GAAP they employ, leading KPMG to conclude “… it 
is likely that individual responses were influenced by a respondent’s familiarity with their own adopted GAAP” 
[KPMG 2000].  Combined, this survey evidence suggests that respondents are more favorably inclined towards the 
GAAP with which they are most familiar, consistent with the arguments made in section 2.1 regarding home bias.   
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following, or are simply large in size attract more foreign investment (Kang and Stulz [1997], 
Ahearne, et al. [forthcoming], Covrig, et al. [2001], Edison and Warnock [2003]).  Accordingly, 
we expect that conformity of accounting method choice with US GAAP will be more strongly 
associated with US institutional investment for firms that have these attributes and, thus, are 
more likely to be reviewed by a large number of US institutions: 
Hypothesis 2: The positive association between the amount of ownership by US institutional 
investors in a firm and the degree of its accounting choice conformity with US GAAP will be 
greater for firms that are more visible to US investors. 
 
This hypothesis is potentially confounded in the case of firms with ADRs.  In addition to 
attracting attention to the firm, listing as an ADR has an impact on the accounting information 
provided by the firm.  ADR firms are required to file a form 20-F that reconciles their local 
GAAP information to US GAAP for selected financial statement categories.  This requirement 
provides US investors with some accounting information that is similar to that which they 
normally use in making investment decisions.  Moreover, subsequent to an ADR listing, firms’ 
accounting information in their home-country financial statements exhibits properties more 
similar to US GAAP firms than to non-ADR firms in their home-country (Lang, et al. 2003).  
This finding suggests that listing an ADR results in changes in the accounting information 
environment similar to those that we predict will increase US investment.  Finally, an exchange-
traded ADR listing also subjects the firm to SEC regulatory oversight, which can boost the 
confidence of investors using financial statement information.3  Using this argument, Edison and 
Warnock [2003] provide evidence consistent with an absence of home bias in emerging market 
                                                 
3 The degree to which such oversight actually occurs is an open empirical question.  Siegel [2002] examines a group 
of Mexican firms cross-listed on US exchanges and finds that “US law enforcement neither deterred nor punished” 
the expropriation of billions of dollars.  Further, he provides evidence that very few SEC actions have ever been 
taken against foreign registrants.  On the Stanford Securities listing of class action law suits, only 14 of the over 
1,500 lawsuits listed as of May 2002 involve foreign registrants. 
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firms that list as an ADR.  Thus, an ADR listing likely impacts the quality of financial 
information provided (at least for US investors) and the credibility of that information.   
However, there are several reasons the form 20-F may not act as a substitute for 
accounting choice in the primary financial statements.  First, the 20-F filed by ADR firms does 
not provide a full set of US GAAP financial statements.  Second, the reconciliations are only 
provided annually, whereas most firms provide quarterly or semi-annual financial reports.   
Third, the 20-F is frequently not provided in as timely of a manner as the initial earnings 
announcement.  Finally, management’s supplementary disclosures, such as the MD&A, will be 
focused on explaining trends and expectations for the information provided in the primary 
statements, not the 20-F.  These features of the 20-F reconciliation suggest that it provides a 
partial and less timely solution for investors using accounting information to monitor ADR firms.     
 The above discussion indicates that our predicted relation between US investment and 
accounting choice is likely impacted by the presence of an ADR for the firm, but the exact 
direction of this impact is difficult to predict.  If accounting choices are only effective in 
mitigating underinvestment once the ADR has garnered attention for the firm and/or increased 
the credibility of the information the firm is providing, then the ADR listing and accounting 
method choice would serve as complements in attracting US investment.  On the other hand, if 
an ADR listing draws attention to the firm and the 20-F provides sufficient accounting 
information to overcome any remaining informational issues, the accounting choice in the 
domestic statements of ADR firms should not be associated with the magnitude of investment by 
US institutions (i.e., accounting method choice and ADRs are substitutes).  We investigate these 
various possibilities by performing separate analyses of firms with and without ADRs.   
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 Combined, our summary of prior literature and related predictions suggest the following 
investment model for US institutions investing internationally.  First, US institutions choose a 
subset of firms to analyze.  We expect that characteristics such as country, industry, size, and 
growth play an important role in identifying this subset.  In addition, the home bias literature 
suggests the subset is related to informational factors that initially attract US investor attention, 
such as an ADR listing, analyst following, and inclusion on a country index.   
Regardless of how this initial subset is constructed, the second step is to analyze these 
companies.  Accounting is a primary input into such analyses.  Accordingly, the accounting 
choices that generate the financial statement information become important at this point in the 
investment process if the buy-side analyst views accounting choices more similar to US GAAP 
as higher quality, more familiar, more credible, and/or lower cost to analyze.  Even if the primary 
analyst is entirely comfortable with non-US GAAP choices, accounting choice would still matter 
if the analyst knows they must provide their analysis to a superior, such as a US-based fund 
manager, who is more comfortable with US GAAP.  In either case, accounting choice impacts 
the ability to use accounting information in analyzing a firm, and thus, the final investment 
decision.  Note that, although we argue accounting choice plays a primary role in the analysis 
underlying that investment decisions, we do not expect that accounting choice is the first-order 
determinant of investment in non-US firms.     
3. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1  Sample 
Our sample consists of 89,078 firm-year observations between 1989 and 1999.  This 
sample represents all firms with nonmissing market, financial statement, and accounting choice 
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data that are not domiciled in either the United States or Canada.4  We refer to this sample as the 
“full sample.”  We are able to obtain US institutional investor holdings data for 4,798 firm-year 
observations in this sample between 1989 and 1999.  For the remainder of the firms in the full 
sample, we assume that US institutional holdings are zero.  To ensure that this assumption does 
not bias our results, we also perform our analysis on the sample of 4,798 observations with at 
least one US institutional investor.  We refer to this sample as the “restricted sample.” 
 We obtain market, financial statement, and accounting choice data from Worldscope.  
This database covers most large firms traded on the world capital markets and collects financial 
statement data from regulatory agencies (such as the Japanese Ministry of Finance) and from the 
companies directly.5  Worldscope also retrieves some data from sources such as stock exchanges 
(e.g., market price information) and other data services such as ExShare (e.g., dividends, 
mergers, restructurings, etc.).  The earliest data available on Worldscope are from 1980; 
however, we use data starting in 1989 due to limited data availability in earlier years.       
 We obtain data on analyst following from I/B/E/S.  Worldscope provides I/B/E/S tickers, 
which allow us to download the number of analysts providing a one-year-ahead earnings forecast 
as of December and match the data to the Worldscope data.  We obtain data on ADR securities 
from the May 2002 listing on the Bank of New York Depository Receipt web site.   
 We collect data on US institutional holdings from the Thomson Financial Spectrum 
database.  We match the Spectrum data to the Worldscope data using CUSIPs when available on 
                                                 
4  We exclude Canadian firms from our sample due to the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System in place between 
the US and Canada during part of our sample period and due to the high level of conformity between US and 
Canadian GAAP. 
5  As of 1999, Worldscope covered over 95% of the total value of worldwide capital markets, representing 22,000 
companies in 53 countries.  Worldscope employs multilingual corporate data analysts that meet accounting and 
financial qualifications.  These analysts undergo extensive training prior to making substantive contributions to the 
actual database.  As of 1999, Worldscope employed over 300 people in four primary collection centers (Bangalore, 
India; Holbury, U.K.; Shannon, Ireland; and Manila, Philippines). 
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Worldscope.  For firms with missing CUSIPs, we attempt to match with name matching 
algorithms.  Finally, we attempt to hand match the remaining firms.   
The Spectrum data is based on the Form 13-F quarterly holdings information filed with 
the SEC.  Rule 13(f) requires institutions managing more than $100 million in equity to file a 
quarterly report with the SEC of all equity holdings greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in 
market value.  This rule does not require firms to include securities traded on markets outside the 
US.  Thus, with the exception of exchange-traded ADR shares, institutions voluntarily report 
holdings in securities of non-US firms.6  As a result, our data likely understates institutional 
investment in some non-US firms and, thus, cannot quantify the extent of home bias in our 
sample.  However, the focus of our study is to explain the cross-sectional variation in reported 
investments to examine the relation between accounting choice and US investment.  Bias may 
occur only if the decision to report a security on a 13-F is systematically related to the degree of 
US GAAP conformity.  For example, if institutions that ignore accounting choices systematically 
fail to report foreign holdings, while institutions that use accounting choice systematically report 
foreign holdings, our results would overweight the importance of accounting choice.  Even in 
this case, accounting choice would still matter for many institutions and our conclusions would 
still hold.  Alternatively, if institutions do not actually use accounting choice in making the 
investment decision, but for some reason only report holdings in firms with relatively high US 
GAAP conformity in their accounting choices, our results would suggest that institutions believe 
accounting choice is important in justifying investments, but not in actually making the 
investments.  We do not believe either reporting bias is likely driving our results.  
                                                 
6  A review of the Spectrum data shows that 75% of the non-US firms in our sample represent direct holdings in 
securities traded on foreign exchanges, as evidenced by CINS numbers (instead of CUSIP’s) and the “ORD” 
indicator to denote ordinary shares (as opposed to ADR shares).  In Section 4.5, we verify that our results are present 
in both ADR and non-ADR subsample to ensure that voluntary reporting is not driving our results.   
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3.2 Variables 
 Table 1 provides definitions of all variables used in the empirical tests.  We use three 
different measures of US institutional ownership.  First, we define an indicator variable, DIH, to 
equal one if a firm has at least one US institutional owner and to equal zero if we were unable to 
find any US institutional owner.  Next, we measure the percentage ownership of US institutions 
in the firm (PIH), defined as total market value of shares owned by US institutions divided by the 
total market value of the firm.  This construct is the most commonly used proxy for institutional 
ownership (see, e.g., Bushee [1998], [2001]; Gompers and Metrick [2001]).  A drawback of this 
measure is that it requires data on total shares outstanding or total market value, which is missing 
for some firms in our sample.7  Finally, we use the log of the number of US institutional 
investors that have nonzero holdings in the stock (LNIH).  This measure has been also used in 
prior research as a proxy for institutional following (e.g. O’Brien and Bhushan, [1990], Walther 
[1997]) and has the advantage that it does not require data on total shares outstanding.  In 
addition, in the presence of restrictions on foreign ownership magnitudes, differing levels of free 
float across countries, and/or large block investments, this measure can provide a cleaner proxy 
for US institutional interest in a stock than PIH does. 
 We measure conformity with US GAAP based on accounting method choice data from 
Worldscope.  Following Bradshaw and Miller [2003], we obtain data on 13 accounting method 
choices and identify whether each choice is allowable under US GAAP.  The Appendix provides 
a listing of the 13 accounting choices we use, the method(s) classified as conforming with US 
                                                 
7  Computing this measure is confounded when firms have multiple share classes.  If market value is available for all 
share classes, we simply sum the market value of all share classes as the denominator.  If price is missing but shares 
outstanding is reported, we divide total shares held by US institutions in all share classes by total shares outstanding 
in all classes.  We must do this for approximately 10% of the sample.  For 5% of sample firms, total shares 
outstanding is missing and we must delete the observation from the test.  In the case of ADRs, we use the 
appropriate translation factors, which are embedded in the Spectrum data on price and shares outstanding. 
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GAAP, and a tabulation of the overall conformity with US GAAP for all non-US and non-
Canada firm-years from 1989-1999.8  Our goal in using these 13 choices is to create a proxy for 
the overall conformity of the firm’s accounting choices with those allowed in the US.  We do not 
view these 13 choices as representing either a comprehensive list of all choices or as the 13 
choices that investors would view as most important.  Rather, they are as comprehensive a set of 
accounting choices as the Worldscope data allow us to compute.   
 We compute two measures of conformity with US GAAP.  RATIO1 is calculated as the 
percentage of the 13 accounting method choices that conform to US GAAP.  The numerator of 
this ratio includes only choices that are disclosed and consistent with US GAAP.  As a 
consequence, nondisclosure of any accounting choice is treated as not consistent with US GAAP.  
Even if the firm were using methods consistent with US GAAP, the lack of disclosure would 
result in US investors being unaware of this choice.  Accordingly, RATIO1 equates 
nondisclosure with disclosure of a non-consistent accounting method in measuring the degree to 
which firm is conveying financial information that is familiar to U.S. investors.  However, 
nondisclosure can result from non-applicability (e.g., accounting for research and development).  
Moreover, Hope [2003a] finds disclosure of accounting choices per se can impact a firm’s 
information environment.  Thus, we compute a second conformity measure (RATIO2) that does 
not “penalize” for nondisclosure.  RATIO2 is calculated as the percentage of the disclosed 
accounting choices that conform to US GAAP.  Both ratios are bounded by the interval [0,1], but 
                                                 
8  The accounting method choices selected represent those for which there is at least one method that can be 
identified as inconsistent with US GAAP.  For example, we do not include the accounting method choice for 
depreciation, because almost all possible depreciation methods coded by Worldscope are acceptable under US 
GAAP.  Unlike Bradshaw and Miller [2003], we do not consider price-level adjustments to be conformant with US 
GAAP because, even though they are technically allowed in the case of a hyperinflationary period, they would not 
be observed in the US during our sample period.  However, our results are virtually identical if we consider these 
adjustments to be conformant with US GAAP. 
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RATIO2 will mechanically have a higher sample mean because we are limiting the calculation to 
the number of disclosed accounting method choices, rather than dividing by the full set of 13. 
We confirm the validity of our US GAAP conformity ratios by examining ADR 
reconciling items.  Firms sponsoring ADRs on US exchanges are required to reconcile local 
GAAP to US GAAP, and Worldscope provides both sets of data.  If RATIO1 and RATIO2 
capture the “closeness” of non-US firms’ local financial reporting to US GAAP, then firms with 
higher (lower) conformity ratios should exhibit lower (higher) ADR reconciling adjustments.  
For all firms with available data on Worldscope, we compute the absolute value of the 
reconciling adjustments for operating income, net income, and total assets as the difference 
between each line item from the local GAAP financial statements and the amount from the ADR 
filing, scaled by the firm’s market value (all amounts in US$).  All correlations between the 
conformity ratios and the reconciling adjustments are negative and significant, confirming that 
our ratio variables capture meaningful differences in financial statements between non-US and 
US GAAP.9  Moreover, Bradshaw and Miller [2003] examine a sample of non-US firms that 
voluntarily adopt US GAAP for local reporting.  Using the same 13 accounting choices, they 
document a significant increase in the conformity ratios upon adoption of US GAAP.  They also 
document a structural shift in the behavior of accounting system outputs for US GAAP adopters.  
They demonstrate that, before adoption of US GAAP, the sample firms exhibit large negative 
correlations between accruals and cash flows, statistically equivalent to correlations for matched 
foreign firms.  However, after adoption of US GAAP, the large negative correlations attenuate 
for the sample firms, becoming statistically equivalent to those of matched US firms.  These 
findings further validate the accounting choice data. 
                                                 
9 The Spearman (Pearson) correlations of the RATIO variables with the absolute value of reconciling adjustments 
for operating income, net income, and total assets range between -0.17 and -0.22 (-0.05 and -0.21).  All of the 
correlations except one are significant at or below the 0.001 level.   
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 We include a number of variables to control for other factors that likely explain US 
institutional ownership in non-US firms.  We use five variables to proxy for the degree of 
visibility and richness of the information environment of non-US firms.  We include an indicator 
variable (ADR) for whether the firm has an American Depository Receipt listed on a US 
exchange (i.e., Level II or III ADRs), which make these firms more visible to US investors than 
non-US firms not listed in the US and which subject the firm to SEC review (Ahearne, et al. 
[forthcoming]).  We also include the log of the number of years the firm has had a Level II or 
Level III ADR listed on a US exchange (ADRTIME).  We add an indicator variable for whether 
a firm is listed on any stock index (DSI), either on its home country exchange or on another non-
US exchange (e.g., FT-SE 100, Nikkei 225, Hang Seng).  Presumably, US investors seeking to 
invest in a certain country will begin their search with firms listed on a major stock index in the 
country (Covrig, et al. [2001]).10  Because Khanna et al. [2003] find that “US disclosure 
practices” are associated with US product market interactions, we include an indicator variable 
for the presence of US sales (USSALES) using Worldscope segment data.  If a firm does not 
disclose segment data, we assume the firm has no US sales.11  Finally, we include the log of the 
number of analysts providing forecasts of the firm’s earnings (LNAL).  Prior research finds that 
this measure is associated with institutional following both in the US and internationally due to 
                                                 
10  This variable is only available for the most current year of Worldscope data.  We set this indicator equal to one 
(zero) for all years a firm is in the sample if it is listed (not listed) on an index in the most recent year.  Thus, this 
measure is likely a noisy measure of index membership in the early sample years.  However, our main results are not 
sensitive to the inclusion of this variable. 
11  Geographic segments are only identifiable for 11% of the Worldscope segment sales data.  We assume that any 
identifier including the US comprises US sales, but this is a noisy measure because the US is often combined with 
other areas in the segment definition, such as Canada, Mexico, South America, Australia, and even Thailand.  For 
this reason, we do not use the magnitude of US sales; however, if we do use this measure, the RATIO variables 
remain significant.  The results are also not sensitive to our assumption that no segment disclosures mean no US 
sales; if we restrict the sample to only firms disclosing segment data, the RATIO variables remain significant.  
Finally, in addition to using a US sales measure, concurrent research also examines an indicator for US assets 
(Khanna et al. [2003]).  In the Worldscope data, only 15 firms report US assets but no US sales, so the US assets 
measure is subsumed by US sales in our sample. 
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the contribution of analysts to a firm’s visibility and information environment (O’Brien and 
Bhushan [1990], Covrig, et al. [2001]).12   
 We also include a number of variables to control for well-documented preferences of 
institutional investors for size, growth, performance, and risk characteristics among US firms.  
Institutions tend to invest more in larger firms because of liquidity, information environment, 
and fiduciary concerns (Kang and Stulz [1997], Bushee [2001], Gompers and Metrick [2001]).  
We proxy for firm size using the log of the firm’s market value of equity in US dollars 
(LMVUS).  Fiduciary concerns also can lead institutions to have preferences for firms with 
better accounting performance and lower risk (Bushee [2001]).  We proxy for accounting 
performance with sales growth over the prior year (SGR) and with return on equity (ROE).   We 
proxy for risk with the leverage ratio, debt-to-assets (DTA).  We use this measure instead of beta 
or systematic risk because of their limited availability on Worldscope.  Institutions tend to adopt 
consistent investment styles based on growth and income attributes, so we also include three 
proxies for firm fundamentals: the earnings-price ratio (EP), the book value-price ratio (BP), and 
dividend yield (DP) (Bushee [2001]).13  Prior research documents an institutional investor 
preference for firms with recent strong market performance (Bushee [2001], Gompers and 
Metrick [2001]), so we include the firm’s raw return over the prior year (RET).  Finally, we 
include an indicator for whether the firm is audited by a Big 5 auditing firm or their predecessors 
(BIG5) to control for US investor preferences for assurance services from auditing firms with 
strong reputations in the US (Aggarwal, et al. [2002]). 
                                                 
12  O’Brien and Bhushan [1990] model the number of analysts and the number of institutions as a simultaneous 
system of equations.  We do not use such an approach in this paper because analyst following is not a main focus of 
the paper and because the limited set of financial variables available on Worldscope would make simultaneous 
equations modeling problematic.  We exclude LNAL from the analysis and find no differences in inferences for our 
main variables of interest. 
13  These three ratios, as well as ROE and DTA, are likely to be affected by both a firm’s economics and its 
accounting choices.  In the latter case, including these ratios potentially biases against us finding a relation between 
US institutional ownership and a firm’s accounting choices. 
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel A of Table 2 presents mean and median values of the variables used in our 
empirical analyses.14  Column 1 presents values for the full sample.  In our sample, 5.4% of the 
firm-year observations in our sample have any US institutional ownership and the mean number 
of institutions per firm is 1.12.  Conformity with US GAAP is fairly low across the full sample.  
The mean value of RATIO1 shows that only 42.1% of the accounting choices, on average, are 
consistent with US GAAP.  The mean value of RATIO2 is 71.2%, suggesting that nondisclosure 
of accounting choices explains a significant part of the low mean for RATIO1.  Only 1.7% of the 
full sample has an exchange listed ADR and 52.3% are listed on a non-US stock index.  These 
full sample statistics indicate that Worldscope covers a broad set of firms and does not overtly 
skew its coverage toward firms with a significant US presence. 
 Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A compare firms without any US institutional ownership to our 
restricted sample (i.e., firms with at least one US institutional investor).  The mean (median) 
number of US institutions per non-US firm is 21 (4), which is far below the comparable number 
for US firms: 113 (58) (from Walther [1997]).  Similarly, the mean percentage of US 
institutional ownership is only 3.4% in non-US firms, compared to 36-39% in the US (as 
reported in Walther [1997] and Bushee [2001]).  While some of these differences may be 
attributable to the voluntary nature of non-ADR reporting on form 13-F, the large magnitude of 
the differences is consistent with the common finding of relatively low foreign investment by US 
investors.15  The degree of conformity with US GAAP is significantly higher in the restricted 
                                                 
14  For variables with extreme outliers (e.g., LMVUS, SGR, ROE, DTA, EP, BP, DP, RET), we winsorize the 
extreme 1% of each tail.  We also estimated all of the models using ranked values of all continuous variables.  The 
RATIO variables remained statistically significant in each model using this specification. 
15  Given the lack of mandatory reporting of US holdings in non-US firms, it is difficult to find reliable data on how 
much US investment there is in non-US firms.  However, Pinkowitz et al. [2002] report that 91.3% of all equity 
investment by US investors is in US firms and, in 1999, only 7% of mutual funds on Spectrum reported 
  20
sample than in the sample with no US institutional ownership, providing univariate support for 
the prediction that US investors prefer firms with higher conformity with US GAAP.  US 
institutions also invest more heavily in ADR firms, firms listed on a stock index, and firms with 
Big 5 auditors.  Finally, US institutions exhibit preferences for firms with greater analyst 
following, larger market cap, higher sales growth and ROE, and higher stock returns, consistent 
with evidence from US data.  
 The last two columns of Panel A compare firms that have exchange-listed ADRs to firms 
that only trade on non-US exchanges.  ADR firms attract significantly more US institutional 
ownership, with 87% (4%) of ADR (non-ADR) firms having at least one US institutional 
investor.  The US GAAP conformity ratios are significantly higher for ADR firms, but still far 
below one.  These two findings indicate the importance of controlling for ADRs when examining 
the relation between US institutional ownership and US GAAP conformity.  Almost all ADR 
firms tend to be listed on a stock index and audited by Big 5 firms. They also have significantly 
greater analyst following, firm size, accounting performance, and market performance.   
 Panel B of Table 2 presents the number of firms in each country represented in our full 
sample, as well as statistics on mean institutional ownership, percent of firms with ADRs and 
stock index membership, mean US GAAP conformity ratios, and the standard deviation of 
conformity ratios for each country.  Japan and the UK have the largest representation in the 
sample, followed by France, Germany, and Australia.  Average US GAAP conformity varies 
significantly across countries from a low of 19% (51%) for RATIO1 (RATIO2) to a high of 59% 
(94%).  Similarly, there is a high degree of variation in the standard deviation of the RATIO 
                                                                                                                                                             
“International” as an investment objective.  Thus, it is likely that the percentage of non-US firms with some US 
investment is not a great deal higher than what we report in our sample. 
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variables across countries, reflecting differences in flexibility of accounting choices across 
countries.  We examine the impact of these differences on our tests in a later section. 
 Panel C of Table 2 presents a correlation matrix for the variables used in our analysis.  
There are a few highly correlated pairs of variables in our data, namely ADR – ADRTIME, 
LMVUS – DSI, LMVUS – LNAL, ROE – EP, and EP – DP.  Multicollinearity diagnostics using 
variance inflation factors on yearly regressions suggest that these correlations do not adversely 
affect our analyses (i.e., all VIF’s are less than three). 
4. Results  
4.1 Levels analysis 
 We test the hypothesis that US investment in non-US firms is associated with a higher 
degree of US GAAP conformity by regressing our measures of US institutional investment on 
the US GAAP conformity ratios and control variables.  We use the following model for our tests: 
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where IH = indicator for US institutional ownership (DIH), log of number of US institutional 
investors (LNIH), or percentage of US institutional ownership (PIH); RATIO = RATIO1 or 
RATIO2; i = firm and t = year. 
 
 When DIH is the dependent variable, we estimate equation (1) using a logistic regression; 
for LNIH and PIH, we use OLS.  We estimate each regression twice: once with RATIO1 and 
once with RATIO2.  To mitigate the influence of cross-sectional correlation, we estimate the 
regressions yearly and report mean coefficients across years, with significance levels based on a 
standard error computed from the distribution of the yearly coefficients (Fama and Macbeth 
1973).  We adjust the standard errors using the serial correlation adjustment in Abarbanell and 
Bernard [2000].  For the RATIO variables, the significance tests are based on one-tailed p-
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values.  Two-tailed tests are used for all other variables.  As a control for correlated omitted 
variables associated with legal, economic, or cultural factors, we adjust every continuous 
variable for the median level of the variable within the country (dropping any country-year with 
fewer than three observations).  Thus, our results should be interpreted as explaining cross-
sectional variation within countries rather than across countries.16 
 Table 3 presents results for our levels analysis.  The first six columns present results for 
the full sample, in which firms with no Spectrum data are assumed to have no US institutional 
investment.  For all three measures of US institutional ownership—indicator, number, and 
percent—and for both US GAAP conformity measures, the coefficient on the US GAAP 
conformity ratio is positive and significant, with five (one) coefficients significant at the 0.01 
(0.05) level.  These results strongly support our first hypothesis that US investors prefer to invest 
in firms exhibiting greater conformity with US GAAP in their accounting choices. 
 The control variables indicate that this result is robust to a number of significant 
determinants of US institutional investment.  The results show that US institutions invest more 
heavily in non-US firms that trade as ADRs and have been listed as such for a long time.  US 
institutions also prefer larger firms with higher ROE, higher leverage (DTA), lower EP ratio, 
lower recent raw returns, and a Big 5 auditor.  In addition, the number of US institutions is 
associated with the presence of US sales.  Interestingly, the relation between institutional 
following and analyst following is positive for the indicator variable and the number of 
institutions, consistent with O’Brien and Bhushan [1990], but negative for the percentage of 
institutional ownership (a similar pattern is found for sales growth).  This result suggests that US 
institutions take larger positions in firms with lower analyst following, perhaps as a result of 
                                                 
16  We also estimated all of our analyses using unadjusted variables with fixed or random effects for country.  Our 
results are significant at similar levels under these approaches. 
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specialized or focused information gathering activities by institutions.  The coefficient on stock 
index membership also changes sign based on the specification, which could be due to fact that 
this variable is only available for the most recent year.  To confirm that these results are not 
driven by multicollinearity with the RATIO variables, we omitted them from the regression and 
found no significant differences in results (not reported).   
 One potential drawback with the full sample results is that the relation between US 
GAAP conformity and US institutional ownership could be driven solely by the presence, rather 
than the magnitude, of US institutional ownership due to the large number of zero observations 
for US institutional following.  As a result, we estimate equation (1) with LNIH and PIH as 
dependent variables in the restricted sample of firms, which consists of firms with at least one 
US institutional investor.17  The last four columns of Table 3 present results from this regression.  
Consistent with the full sample results, the four coefficients on the US GAAP conformity ratios 
are all positive and highly significant (p-value < 0.01).  The coefficient of 0.9884 (0.0809) on 
RATIO1 in the LNIH (PIH) regression indicates that a change of six accounting choices (i.e., a 
change of 0.46 in the ratio) would result in a 1.6 (3.8%) increase in the number (percentage) of 
US institutional owners.  These numbers are small in absolute terms, but represent a meaningful 
increase in US institutions relative to the means and medians in Table 2.  Thus, the degree of 
conformity with US GAAP in accounting choices has a significant influence on not only the 
presence, but the magnitude, of investment by US institutional investors. 
While many of the control variables exhibit the same relation with US institutional 
ownership in the restricted sample, there are some notable differences.  The relations between the 
number of US institutions and number of analysts, sales growth, and leverage flip signs in the 
                                                 
17  We perform the median-adjustment of the variables based on the full sample of firms, rather than within the 
restricted sample, because of the dramatically smaller number of firms per country in this sample.  Because of this 
approach, the intercept is larger in magnitude in the restricted sample than in the full sample. 
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restricted sample.  A similar reversal exists for the relation between the percentage of 
institutional ownership and firm size.  Thus, conditional on a non-US firm having some basic 
attribute that attracts US institutional investors (such as an ADR), US institutions favor less 
followed, lower dividend yield firms among this set.  Regressions omitting the US GAAP 
conformity ratios reveal that these relations still hold, indicating that the differences between 
samples is not driven by the inclusion of the conformity ratios (not reported).  
4.1.1 Sensitivity analyses 
 We perform a number of robustness checks to examine how pervasive these results are 
across countries and years (not reported).  First, we examine whether countries with a small 
number of observations influence the results.  We drop all countries with fewer than 200 
observations and continue to find a significant relation between the RATIO variables and US 
institutional ownership.  Moreover, this relation is significantly positive in each of the five 
largest countries in the sample: Japan, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Australia.  The 
results are also significant when these five countries are dropped from the sample.  In examining 
the coefficients from the yearly regressions, we find that the relation between the RATIO 
variables and US investment is positive in all 11 years for all specifications.  Interestingly, the 
magnitude and significance of the coefficients on the conformity ratios are stronger in the latter 
half of the sample (1995-99).  This finding suggests that deviations from US GAAP have 
become more important as accounting systems have moved toward greater harmonization. 
To ensure that no single accounting choice is driving the results, we sequentially estimate 
the regressions dropping one of the 13 items from RATIO1 and RATIO2 each time.  For 
RATIO2, the item is removed from both the numerator and denominator.  We estimate these 
regressions on both the full and restricted samples for both LNIH and PIH, yielding a total of 104 
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regressions.  In only two of the 104 regressions is the coefficient on the RATIO variable not 
significantly greater than zero at the 0.05 level, and in one of those two cases, the coefficient is 
significant at the 0.10 level.  Thus, the evidence suggests that the RATIO variables are not driven 
by one specific accounting choice. 
We also investigate whether analyses using individual accounting choices or subsets of 
choices would be feasible.  In the full sample, the mean (median) bivariate correlation between 
individual choices is 0.71 (0.70) and all bivariate correlations are greater than 0.50.  Moreover, 
the Cronbach’s alpha for the RATIO1 index is 0.96, substantially above Nunnally's [1978] 
suggested value of 0.70 for a reliable index.  Thus, the high multicollinearity among individual 
items would prevent us from obtaining meaningful results by including all 13 choices separately.  
Based on this, we estimate a factor analysis on the 13 choices to explore whether there are any 
common factors among the choices.  The first eigenvalue was 4.72 and the second eigenvalue 
was 0.76, suggesting there is one factor.  The scree plot also suggests one factor.  The proportion 
of the variance explained by the first factor is 89 percent, which does leave the possibility open 
for a second factor.  We force a two-factor solution and examine both an orthogonal and oblique 
rotation.  In both cases, the groups of the items in each factor seem essentially arbitrary and 
suggest no obvious underlying construct.  Thus, the data strongly suggest that there are not 
meaningful subsets of choices within the RATIO variables.   
Next, we estimate the LNIH and PIH models in the full and restricted samples replacing 
the RATIO1 variable with each accounting choice individually.  In 45 of the 52 regressions, the 
coefficient on the individual accounting choice is positive and significant at the 0.05 level; in 
only two regressions is a coefficient negative.  We ranked these coefficients within each model 
to check whether US investors consistently place higher weights on any given choice.  The 
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ranking differed greatly by sample and dependent variable, suggesting that US investors are not 
fixating on one accounting choice.  Rather, because of the high correlations among the 
accounting choices, each one proxies, to some extent, for the closeness of the firm’s accounting 
to US GAAP. 
We also examine two additional controls that are only available for small subsets of the 
Worldscope data.  First, we include the percent of a firm’s stock that is closely held.  Second, we 
proxy for financing requirements using the absolute value of the net external financing cash 
flows during the year, which include both debt and equity flows.  We include these variables as 
controls in the regressions for the full sample only.  Both measures of US institutional ownership 
(LNIH and PIH) are negatively related to the level of closely-held ownership, as would be 
expected.  LNIH is negatively related to the external financing variable, suggesting that this 
variable is proxying for debt, rather than equity, activity.  In each case, the RATIO variables 
retain their significance levels after the inclusion of these two controls.  Thus, our results are 
robust to a number of other potential explanations.   
Finally, a firm’s decision to adopt a given accounting method is likely driven by many 
factors, some of which may be related to doing business in the United States and/or other issues 
that would impact US investment.  This suggests that an analysis that jointly models accounting 
choice and US investment would be useful.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to create a functional 
form for the decision regarding even one accounting choice, let alone the 13 included in this 
paper.  As an alternative, we appeal to the findings in Bradshaw and Miller [2003], who examine 
the more extreme decision of non-US firms formally adopting US GAAP.  They compare US 
GAAP firms with a matched sample of firms from their home country and find the US GAAP 
firms are more likely to have a US security, are larger, and more likely to be audited by a big 5 
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firms.  We have included all characteristics Bradshaw and Miller [2003] find as significant as 
either control variables in the main analyses or as a portion of the sensitivity tests mentioned 
above.  In all cases, our results regarding the US GAAP conformity ratio remain significant.    
4.2  Changes analysis 
To provide additional assurance that our levels results are not driven by a correlated 
omitted variable and to gauge the sensitivity of US investment to changes in accounting choices, 
we test the relation between contemporaneous changes in US GAAP conformity and in US 
institutional investment using the following model: 
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where all variables starting with “C” represent one-year changes in the variable, CIH = change in 
log of number of US institutional investors (CLNIH) or change in percentage of US institutional 
ownership (CPIH); CRATIO = CRATIO1 or CRATIO2; DIH = 1 if firm has at least one 
institutional investor and zero otherwise; i = firm and t = year. 
 
 We again estimate the regression separately for CRATIO1 and CRATIO2.  All 
regressions are estimated yearly with country-adjusted continuous variables and the standard 
errors are adjusted for serial correlation using the Abarbanell and Bernard [2000] approach.18  
We drop the stock index indicator variable because it is identical for all years.  We replace it 
with an indicator for at least one US institutional investor (DIH) to control for the numerous zero 
changes that are due to zero ownership.  The DIH variable is dropped in the restricted sample 
results.  Because the yearly change in the ADRTIME variable would not be meaningful, we use 
the prior level of the variable to proxy for any effect of listing time.  Finally, we add the change 
                                                 
18  In the presence of significant negative serial correlation among yearly coefficients, which occasionally occurs 
with changes variables, this approach can lead to downward-biased standard errors.  As a check, we estimated every 
model in the paper without the adjustment for serial correlation.  In every case, the coefficients on the CRATIO 
variables that are significant with the correction are also significant without the correction.  Thus, there is no case in 
which an insignificant CRATIO coefficient is made significant through the serial correlation adjustment. 
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in shares outstanding (CSHARES) as a proxy for new equity issuances.  Managers wishing to 
raise new equity may have incentives to expand the supply of potential investors by conforming 
their accounting to US GAAP to attract more US investors.19 
Panel A of table 4 presents results for changes in the variables for both samples and for 
both conformity ratios.  The requirement of an extra year of data reduces the sample size to 
79,644 (4,616) for the full (restricted) sample in these analyses.  In the full sample, the 
coefficients on the changes in US GAAP conformity ratios are positive and significant at or 
below the 0.05 level for both ratios and both measures of institutional ownership.  In addition, 
the coefficients on the changes in conformity ratios for the restricted sample are positive and 
significant in all but one regression (the relation between CLNIH and CRATIO1).  These results 
suggest that US institutions change their holdings in response to changes in the degree of 
conformity with US GAAP, providing additional strong support for our hypothesis that US 
investors are attracted to firms using accounting choices consistent with US GAAP.20 
 The results for the control variables suggest that few of the significant relations found in 
levels hold in one-year changes.  The notable exceptions are analyst following and firm size, 
both of which are significantly positively related to US institutional ownership in contemporary 
changes.  Again, unreported results indicate that the control variable relations exist in the 
absence of the CRATIO variables. 
 Next, we examine whether these results are present for both increases and decreases in 
US GAAP conformity ratios.  This analysis is based on the presumption that buying and selling 
                                                 
19 The number of yearly observations with changes in ADR listing, US sales, and Big 5 status are generally less than 
5%.  To ensure that this extreme imbalance in values does not affect our results, we estimate the regressions with the 
change variables omitted and with them replaced by levels indicators (i.e. ADR, USS, BIG5).  We also drop the 
ADRTIME variable from the specification because it flips sign between contemporaneous and future changes and 
we replace the signed CSHARES variable with the absolute value measure.  None of these alternative specifications 
change any of our inferences on the US GAAP conformity ratios. 
20  We also estimated these regressions with two-year changes in all of the variables and found similar results. 
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decisions are intrinsically asymmetric; the decision to buy involves assessing a large population 
of potential firms and choosing among them, while the decision to sell is based on assessing the 
much smaller population of firms currently in the investment portfolio.  We expect accounting 
choice to be one factor among many (growth, liquidity, returns etc.) that impacts the initial 
decision of US institutions to invest in a non-US firm.  However, a change in this accounting 
choice is not as likely to precipitate the selling of a currently-held stock unless the other items 
that led to the original purchase have changed in the same manner.  Further, it is likely that the 
US institution has developed some familiarity with the non-US firm while holding the 
company’s stock, and the additional information provided by conforming accounting choices 
may no longer be as important in monitoring the firm.  Prior research provides evidence of this 
asymmetry.  Bushee and Noe [2000] finds that institutions exhibit asymmetric reactions to 
changes in disclosure practices; increases in institutional ownership accompany increases in 
disclosure quality, but decreases in disclosure quality are not associated with decreases in 
institutional ownership.   
Panel B of Table 4 presents results of a piecewise regression in which the change in the 
US GAAP conformity ratio is decomposed into positive and negative changes in the ratio.  
CRATIO1+ (CRATIO1-) is set equal to CRATIO1 if it is greater than (less than or equal to) zero 
and set equal to zero otherwise (CRATIO2 is decomposed similarly).  Thus, the coefficients can 
be interpreted as the slopes for positive and negative values of the variables, respectively.  The 
results indicate that increases in US GAAP conformity are positively associated with changes in 
US institutional ownership in all specifications, with the coefficient significantly different from 
zero in seven of the eight specifications.  Conversely, decreases in US GAAP conformity are 
positively associated with changes in US institutional ownership in only five of the eight 
  30
specifications, with none of the coefficients significantly different than zero.  Thus, US 
institutions appear to use US GAAP conformity as a screen in their investment decisions, but do 
not significantly reduce their holdings in response to a later reduction in US GAAP conformity.   
One potential explanation for this result is that we include the zero changes with the 
negative changes in US GAAP conformity.  We estimated the regression with the zero changes 
included with the positive changes in US GAAP conformity and found that the increases in 
conformity continued to be significant and the reductions remained insignificant.  Another 
potential explanation is that we use country-adjusted variables (although the decomposition into 
positive and negative changes is based on the raw change).  Using unadjusted variables yields 
virtually identical results.  Finally, we examined two-year changes in the variables and found the 
same results.  Thus, the asymmetric response of US institutions to changes in US GAAP 
conformity ratios appears to be a robust result. 
4.3 Lead-Lag analyses 
 Our maintained hypothesis is that US institutional investors respond to accounting 
choices made by non-US firms.  The evidence in the levels and changes analyses supports this 
prediction.  However, it is possible that the prior results reflect managers of non-US firms 
changing their accounting choices in response to investment by US institutional investors, or that 
the results reflect both effects.  In either case, it would still indicate that US investors prefer US 
GAAP.  To provide evidence on causality, we examine lead-lag regressions to test whether 
changes in conformity ratios lead to future changes in US institutional ownership and whether 
changes in US institutional ownership lead to future changes in conformity ratios.  Following the 
results in Panel B of Table 4, we decompose changes in US GAAP conformity ratios into 
positive and negative changes.   
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 Panel A of Table 5 presents results of regressions of one-year future changes in the 
number and percent of US institutional ownership on prior one-year changes in the US GAAP 
conformity ratios and control variables.  For parsimony, we report only results from the full 
sample; results for the restricted sample are similar.  The requirement of an extra year of data for 
this test reduces the sample size to 67,264.  The results indicate that increases in both conformity 
ratios are significantly positively related to future changes in both the number of institutional 
investors and the percentage of institutional ownership.21  Thus, changes in accounting choices 
lead to future changes in the following of US institutional investors. 
 Panel B of Table 5 presents results of regressions of one-year future changes in the US 
GAAP conformity ratios on prior one-year changes in the number and percent of US institutional 
ownership.  We use the same control variables as in the future change in institutional ownership 
regression, as Bradshaw and Miller [2003] use similar variables to explain the adoption of US 
GAAP.  To be consistent with Panel A, we decompose changes in institutional following into 
positive and negative changes.  In these regressions, all of the coefficients on the changes in US 
institutional ownership are insignificantly different from zero.  If we use continuous changes in 
institutional following rather than the piecewise specification, the coefficients are all 
insignificant (not reported).  Thus, we find no evidence of a positive relation between changes in 
US institutional ownership and future changes in US GAAP conformity ratios, suggesting that 
managers do not change accounting choices in response to changes in the presence of US 
institutional investors.  This finding is not surprising given the evidence in Table 2 that US 
                                                 
21  If we use the continuous CRATIO variables instead of the piecewise specification, the coefficients on both 
CRATIO1 and CRATIO2 continue to be significant in the future change in percentage ownership regressions but are 
no longer significant in the future change in number of institutions regressions.   
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institutions generally have a very small ownership position in non-US firms, and hence are not in 
a strong position to enact changes in policy through corporate governance activities.22 
4.4 Industry-adjusted analyses 
Another possible alternative explanation for a positive relation between US GAAP 
conformity and US institutional investment is that US institutions tend to invest only in certain 
industries in foreign countries, and these industries use accounting methods that more closely 
conform to US GAAP.  To check this explanation, we define industries at the 2-digit SIC code 
level and estimate all of the regressions with all continuous variables adjusted by the median for 
the firm’s industry, instead of the firm’s country.  Table 6 presents results for the industry-
adjusted analysis for the full sample.  Because the coefficients on the control variables are 
virtually identical when RATIO2 is included instead of RATIO1, we present the full model for 
RATIO1 and only the coefficient on RATIO2.  The first two columns replicate the levels 
analysis in Table 3.  Consistent with Table 3, both RATIO1 and RATIO2 are significantly 
positively associated with the level of US institutional ownership.  The next two columns 
replicate the contemporaneous changes analysis in Panel B of Table 4 and the last two columns 
replicate the future changes in US institutional ownership analysis of Table 5.  Again, the 
industry-adjustment does not affect our primary conclusions, as increases in the US GAAP 
conformity ratios are significantly positively associated with current and future increases in US 
institutional ownership.  These results also hold in the restricted sample (not reported). 
                                                 
22  It is possible that changes in conformity ratios lead to future changes in analyst following or ADR listing, which 
contemporaneously attract more US institutions.  To insure the use of lagged control variables is not driving the 
results, we estimate all of the tests in Table 5 using future changes in control variables (i.e., changes in control 
variables concurrent with the changes in dependent variables).  The CRATIO variables continue to significantly 
explain future changes in US institutional ownership at the same significance levels.  The changes in US 
institutional ownership variables remain insignificant in the FCRATIO regressions. 
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We also check whether our results are robust to joint adjustment for country and industry.  
First, we include industry fixed effects in addition to the country-adjusted variables.  In a 
separate analysis, we adjust all variables for the median level of firms in the same industry in the 
same country, dropping any country-industries with fewer than three observations.  We perform 
this analysis only on the full sample due to the large loss in observations.  In every case, our 
results for the US GAAP conformity ratios remained significant at or below the 0.10 level.  
Thus, industry investment patterns do not explain our results. 
4.5 Analyses on subsamples of firms based on ADR status and on visibility proxies 
 In this section, we examine the relation between US GAAP conformity ratios and US 
institutional investment in subsamples of firms based on ADR status and on proxies for the 
visibility of the non-US firms to US investors.  Given the importance of visibility to US investors 
in mitigating home bias, we expect that the relation between accounting choice and US 
investment will be stronger for samples of firms that are more visible to US investors, and hence 
more likely to be in US investors’ potential investment set.  We perform subsample analyses on 
four separate partitions to proxy for visibility: 1) ADR vs. no ADR, 2) listing on a stock index 
vs. no listing, 3) high analyst following (top decile in a given year) vs. low following, and 4) 
large firms (top decile in a given year) vs. small firms.23  We estimate regressions of US 
institutional ownership on RATIO1 and the controls (see equation (1)) for both subsamples in 
each partition and report the coefficients and tests of significant differences from zero in Table 7.  
Then, we estimate a SUR model to test whether the coefficients are significantly different from 
each other in the two subsamples.  This significance test is reported in the “DIFF” column.  We 
repeat this procedure for RATIO2, and again only report the coefficient on this variable instead 
                                                 
23  Because the distribution of analyst following and firm size is highly skewed, we use only the top decile as a 
proxy for high analyst following and large firms to ensure meaningful differences between the two groups. 
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of repeating all of the controls.  To ensure a sufficient number of observations in each subsample 
in our yearly regressions, we perform this estimation on the full sample. 
 Panel A of Table 7 presents results for the partition based on ADR status.  For both the 
LNIH and PIH regressions, the coefficients on the US GAAP conformity ratio are significantly 
positive, suggesting that accounting choices are related to US institutional investment regardless 
of whether the firm trades in the US as an ADR or not.  Moreover, the coefficients on the 
conformity ratios are significantly greater in the ADR firm subsample, indicating that the 
relation between accounting choice and US investment is stronger when the firm lists as an ADR 
in US.  The coefficient of 2.1342 (0.1165) on RATIO1 in the LNIH (PIH) regression in the ADR 
subsample indicates that, once an institution has become highly visible to US investors, a change 
of six accounting choices would result in a 2.7 (5.4%) increase in the number (percentage) of US 
institutional owners.  Consistent with our second hypothesis, these results suggests that 
accounting choices complement the visibility, accounting reconciliation, and/or SEC review 
aspects of the ADR listing in attracting more US institutional investment.24 
 Panels B, C, and D of Table 7 report results for the partitions based on listing on a stock 
index, high analyst following, and large firm size, respectively.  For each of these visibility 
proxies, the coefficients on the US GAAP conformity ratios are significantly positive in both 
subsamples for both measures of US institutional investment.  Thus, conformity with US GAAP 
is an important determinant of US investment regardless of how visible the firm is to US 
investors.  Moreover, for each of the visibility proxies, the coefficient on the conformity ratios is 
                                                 
24  About 3% of the firm-year observations in the non-ADR subsample are firms that have a non-exchange-traded 
ADR security offered in the US market.  These securities include Level I ADRs, which are not reviewed by the 
SEC, and Rule 144A and Reg S private placements.  If we exclude these firms from the non-ADR subsample, we 
obtain similar results.  If we include these firms in the ADR subsample, all of the coefficients on the RATIO 
variables remain significant, but the magnitudes are smaller.  This suggests that non-exchange-traded ADRs provide 
less visibility to US institutions than exchange-traded ADRs. 
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again significantly greater in the higher visibility subsample, supporting our second hypothesis 
that accounting choice complements visibility in attracting US investment.25 
 Overall, the results suggest that the degree of conformity with US GAAP in a non-US 
firm’s accounting choices is an important, incremental factor in mitigating home bias and 
attracting a higher level of investment by US institutional investors.  Moreover, accounting 
choice conformity provides a larger incremental effect for firms that are already visible to US 
investors through an ADR, listing on a stock index, high analyst following, or large size. 
4.6 Analyses on subsamples of firms based on country-level factors 
Prior research has documented significant differences across countries in terms of legal 
traditions, levels of disclosure, and amount of earnings management (La Porta, et al. 1998, Leuz, 
et al. 2003).  In addition, countries differ in the degree to which their statutory accounting rules 
allow conformity to US GAAP.  Our within-country analysis should control for these 
differences.  Nevertheless, we estimate our regressions within subsamples of countries 
partitioned on these dimensions.  These analyses are primarily descriptive as it is not obvious 
how these country-level factors should impact the within-country relation between US 
investment and US GAAP conformity.  However, it is important to document that our within-
country results are robust to these important country-level differences. 
First, we divide our sample countries into code law versus common law legal traditions 
using the classification in La Porta, et al. [1998].  Ball, et al. [2000] argue that common law 
systems are more shareholder-based, solving information asymmetries by public disclosure, 
whereas code law systems are more stakeholder-based, providing a larger role for  private 
communication.  In our setting, greater US GAAP conformity could improve timeliness of 
                                                 
25  We also estimate the changes specification (equation (2)) for all of these partitions.  For both one- and two-year 
changes in all variables, the coefficients on the CRATIO variable in the high visibility subsample are always 
significantly greater than the coefficients in the low visibility subsample at the 0.10 level (not reported).   
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information in code law countries, whereas in common law countries, US GAAP conformity 
would be more of a familiarity issue for US investors.   Table 8 reports results of our levels 
analysis in the code and common law partitions.  For parsimony, we only report results for the 
full sample with LNIH as the dependent variable; similar results are obtained in the restricted 
sample and with PIH as the dependent variable.  The coefficients on both RATIO1 and RATIO2 
are significant in all subsamples in both partitions.  Thus, US institutional ownership is 
associated with US GAAP conformity regardless of the country’s legal tradition. 
Second, we divide our sample countries into those with high and low disclosure regimes, 
based on the mean CIFAR score (as reported in Hope [2003b]).  It is possible that transparency is 
a substitute for accounting choice so that the US GAAP conformity ratios are less (more) 
important in countries that have more (less) transparent mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
regimes.  Table 8 shows that the coefficients on RATIO1 and RATIO2 are positive and 
significant in both partitions.  Interesting, the RATIO variables have significantly greater 
coefficients in the high disclosure countries, suggesting that accounting choice complements 
other forms of corporate transparency in attracting US investment.   
Third, we partition countries based on differences in statutory GAAP flexibility, which 
could influence the potential degree of conformity with US GAAP.  Hope [2003a] provides some 
evidence that disclosure of accounting choice is more useful to analysts when more potential 
choices exist.  To proxy for statutory flexibility, we classify any country with a standard 
deviation of RATIO1 above the median level for all countries to be a high flexibility country.  
Table 8 reports that the coefficients on both RATIO1 and RATIO2 are again significant in both 
partitions.  We repeated the analyses based on the standard deviation of RATIO2 and on country 
means of RATIO1 and RATIO2 and found identical results.  Thus, US institutional ownership is 
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associated with US GAAP conformity regardless of the degree of flexibility allowed by the 
countries’ local GAAP. 
Finally, we examine whether country-level properties of accounting quality, specifically 
the amount of earnings management, influence the sensitivity of US investors to accounting 
choice.  Leuz, et al. [2003] argues that the pervasiveness of earnings management in a country is 
decreasing in the amount of outside investor protection.  Thus, US GAAP conformity could be 
proxying for the ability of non-US managers to extract private control benefits through earnings 
management.  We use the aggregate country-level earnings management scores from Leuz, et al. 
[2003] to split our sample countries at the median into “high” and “low” earnings management 
countries.  Table 8 reports that RATIO1 and RATIO2 are significant in both partitions.  The 
coefficients on the RATIO variables are significantly larger in the low earnings management 
countries, suggesting that accounting choices are more important where the accounting numbers 
are more reliable.   
5.  Conclusions 
 In this paper, we investigate the relation between accounting method choice and 
investment by US institutions for a group of non-US firms.  We find that firms employing 
accounting methods that are consistent with US GAAP attract more US institutional investors 
and have a higher level of investment by US institutions.  This relation exists for a broad cross-
section of firms after controlling for items previously documented as being related to investment.  
However, its magnitude is greater once some other mechanism, such as an ADR listing, being 
part of a stock index, high analyst following and/or large size, attracts US investors’ attention to 
the firm.  Finally, we find evidence that a change towards accounting choices consistent with US 
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GAAP leads to a subsequent increase in investment by US institutions, but we find no evidence 
that US institutional investment leads to a change in accounting choices. 
Our analyses are subject to several caveats.  First, SEC Rule 13(f) does not require firms 
to report holdings in non-US securities traded on non-US exchanges.  We believe that a 
significant number of funds voluntarily report their non-US holdings and that the voluntary 
reporting choice is random, which simply adds noise to our tests.  However, it is possible that 
institutional investors condition their voluntarily reporting decision on the accounting choices of 
the company issuing the security.  In that case, our results would suggest that, while investing 
decisions are not sensitive to accounting choices, reporting decisions are sensitive.  Second, our 
study only examines US investors.  As with any study using only one country to study 
international effects, it is possible that our results do not generalize to investors in other 
countries.  This threat to generalizability is likely even higher due to the feeling by many that US 
GAAP is among the highest quality sets of accounting standards, which suggests US investors 
are more biased in favor of their home standards than would be investors in other countries.  This 
suggests that it would be interesting for future literature to undertake similar studies both in 
countries where the home GAAP is considered high quality (such as the UK or Sweden), and in 
those where the home GAAP is not designed to provide high quality external equity valuation 
information (such as the Germany or France).  Finally, it is possible that some firms choose US 
GAAP accounting as part of a more comprehensive strategy to attract US institutional investors 
(i.e. targeted disclosure, road shows, etc.), and that some of the investment we observe is due to 
the omitted disclosure strategy variable.  Ideally, we would control for these other targeting 
mechanisms in our regressions, but we are unable to observe many of these activities given their 
private nature and the lack of archival data.  However, if true, this argument suggests that 
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mangers view accounting choices as a key part of attracting US investors, consistent with our 
arguments.      
 Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways.  First, we show that accounting 
method choices lead US investment, suggesting that accounting choice impacts foreign 
investment decisions.  This is the first study that we are aware of to directly examine this 
relation.  Second, our finding that diversity in accounting choices impacts the level of foreign 
investment provides information to the debate regarding whether attempts to internationally 
harmonize accounting will impact cross-border capital flows.  Third, we contribute to the home 
bias literature by demonstrating that the accounting choice of managers impacts the ability of 
firms to attract international capital.  We expand on this contribution by showing that accounting 
method choice is more effective at impacting international investment once attention has been 
drawn to the firm through another mechanism.  While prior research attributes most of the 
informational issues of home bias to a lack of knowledge that the firms exists, our results 
indicate that the informational issues that impact home bias are multileveled and at least partially 
due to reporting decisions made by the firm’s managers.   
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Appendix 
Accounting Method Choices and Overall Conformity of Non-U.S. Firm Choices with US GAAP (1988-1999) 
Accounting Method 
Choice Consistent with US GAAP Not consistent with US GAAP 
% 
Consistent
% Not 
consistent 
% Not 
disclosing 
1.   Accounting for 
goodwill 
•  Amortized 
•  Amortized and/or taken to 
reserves 
 
•  Not amortized, expensed when incurred 
•  Written off at management discretion 
•  Taken to reserves 
27.8% 21.2% 51.0% 
2.   Accounting for other 
intangibles/deferred 
charges 
•  Amortized •  Capitalized, not amortized 
•  Expensed when incurred 
•  Capitalized, written off at management discretion 
•  Taken to reserves 54.6% 4.5% 40.9% 
3.   Accounting for long 
term financial leases 
•  Capitalized and amortized •  Expensed 
•  Some capitalized and some expensed 20.6% 1.5% 77.9% 
4.  Accounting method for 
long term investments 
less than 20% 
•  Cost 
•  Lower of cost and intrinsic 
value 
•  Equity 
•  Market value 
55.9% 2.3% 41.8% 
5.  Accounting method for 
long term investments 
21-50% 
•  Equity 
•  Equity but consolidated 
where significant influence 
•  Equity and cost depending 
on significant influence 
•  Cost 
•  Cost but consolidated where significant influence 
•  Equity and proportional consolidation 
38.7% 22.0% 39.3% 
6.  Accounting method for 
long term investments 
greater than 50% 
•  All subsidiaries are 
consolidated 
•  Consolidation for 
significant subsidiaries - 
others are on an equity basis 
•  Consolidation for 
significant subsidiaries, 
others are on a cost basis 
•  Domestic subsidiaries consolidated - others on a cost basis 
•  Domestic subsidiaries consolidated - others on a equity basis 
•  Foreign subsidiaries consolidated - others on a cost basis 
•  Foreign subsidiaries consolidated - others on a equity basis 
•  No consolidation - cost basis (parent company only)  
•  No consolidation - equity basis (parent company only) 
 
74.4% 23.4% 2.2% 
7.   Deferred taxes 
recorded 
•  Yes •  No - taxes paid as incurred 
53.1% 23.2% 23.7% 
8.  Treasury stock location 
on balance sheet 
•  Deduction from 
shareholders' equity 
•  Long term investment 
•  Other asset 
•  Current assets 17.4% 11.8% 70.8% 
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Appendix (continued) 
Accounting Method Choices and Overall Conformity of Non-U.S. Firm Choices with US GAAP (1988-1999) 
9.   Financial statements 
cost basis 
•  Historical cost entirely •  Historical cost with price-level adjustment or revaluation of 
specific accounts 
•  Historical cost with supplementary current cost financial 
information 
•  Current cost statements entirely 
•  Modified historical cost with supplemental current cost 
financial information 
•  Current cost with supplemental historical cost financial 
information 74.9% 11.4% 13.7% 
10. Funds definition on 
statement of changes 
in financial position 
•  Cash 
•  Modified cash 
•  Prior to 1989, other 
definitions acceptable under 
APB 19 
•  Working capital 
•  Modified working capital 
•  Unique definition 
•  Net borrowings 
•  Net liquid assets 29.0% 36.4% 34.6% 
11. Marketable securities 
valuation 
•  Lower of cost or market 
•  Historical cost 
•  Subsequent to 1993, 
current market value and cost 
with periodic valuation 
acceptable under SFAS115 
•  Current market value 
•  Moving average 
•  Weighted average 
•  Periodic average 
•  Cost with periodic revaluation 
34.8% 11.7% 53.5% 
12. Research and 
development costs 
•  Expensed currently 
•  For computer companies in 
SIC codes 5054, 7371, or 
7372, Capitalized and 
amortized later or Some 
expensed some capitalized 
are consistent with US GAAP
•  Capitalized and amortized later 
•  Expensed and capitalized later 
•  Some expensed - some capitalized 
20.8% 5.2% 74.0% 
13. Starting line of 
statement of changes 
in financial position 
•  Net income, bottom line 
•  Prior to 1989, Net income 
before minority interest, Net 
income before extraordinary 
items, and other definitions 
were acceptable under APB 
19. 
•  Net income before net allocations to reserves 
•  Net income before minority interest and taxes 
•  Unique 
•  Sales 
•  Sales plus other operating income 
•  Operating income 
•  Net income before interest 
•  Cash receipts 
•  Operating income before depreciation 
•  Other 23.9% 41.3% 34.8% 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
DIH Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has at least one US institutional investor during the year 
PIH Percentage ownership by U.S. institutions in the firm, defined as total market value of shares owned by U.S. institutions divided by the total 
market value of the firm (average of four quarters during the year) 
LNIH Log of the number of U.S. institutional investors that have nonzero holdings in the firm (average of four quarters during the year) 
RATIO1 Number of accounting method choices consistent with US GAAP divided by 13 (the total number of choices examined) 
RATIO2 Number of accounting method choices consistent with US GAAP divided by the total number of method choices disclosed  
ADR Indicator variable equal to 1 if there is a sponsored American Depository Receipt trading on a U.S. exchange (level II or III) 
ADRTIME Log of the number of years that the firm has had an exchange-traded ADR listed in the US market 
DSI Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm's stock is part of any stock market index (e.g., FT-SE 100, Nikkei 225, Hang Seng, etc.) 
USSALES Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm discloses US segment sales and zero if the firm doesn’t disclose either segment sales or US segment sales
LNAL Log of number of analysts providing earnings forecasts during December  
LMVUS Log of market value of the company based on year-end price and shares outstanding, converted to $US using the year-end exchange rate 
SGR The one-year growth in net sales, calculated as [(current year sales/last year sales)-1] 
ROE Return on equity, calculated as (net income after preferred dividends/beginning common equity) 
DTA The debt-to-total assets ratio, calculated as [(long-term debt + short-term debt + current portion long-term debt)/total assets] 
EP Earnings-to-price ratio, calculated as (earnings per share/year-end market price) 
BP Book-to-market ratio, calculated as (book value per share/year-end market price) 
DP Dividend yield, calculated as (dividends per share/year-end market price) 
RET Total one-year raw return (including all dividends and other distributions)  
BIG5 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm's auditor is one of the Big 5 (or their predecessors) 
All variables except DSI are measured annually between the years 1989 and 1999.  DSI is only available for the latest year in the sample; this value is applied to 
each year the firm is in the sample.  DIH, PIH, and LNIH are obtained from the Thompson Financial Spectrum Database of institutional holdings.  This database 
has all of the quarterly holdings of US institutional investors required to file a SEC form 13-f.  In about 10% of the cases, market value data is not available for 
the computation of PIH and total shares outstanding is used instead (which is an approximation in the case of multiple share classes).  For another 5% of the 
observations, total shares outstanding is also not available and PIH is coded as missing.  In all cases, appropriate adjustments are made for the market value of 
ADR share classes.  NAL is obtained from the I/B/E/S database of analyst forecasts.  ADR listings are obtained from the Bank of New York website.  All other 
variables are collected from the Worldscope database.  These variables are defined by Worldscope, which, similar to other commercial databases, occasionally 
makes slight adjustments in certain countries or industries to properly incorporate country-specific differences in accounting practices. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Means and Medians 
Variable  Full Sample  NIH = 0 NIH > 0 Diff  No ADR ADR Diff 
DIH Mean 0.054  0.000 1.000 n/a  0.040 0.874 ** 
 Median 0.000  0.000 1.000 n/a  0.000 1.000 ** 
           
NIH Mean 1.115  0.000 20.698 n/a  0.480 38.076 ** 
 Median 0.000  0.000 4.000 n/a  0.000 16.000 ** 
           
PIH Mean 0.002  0.000 0.034 n/a  0.001 0.055 ** 
 Median 0.000  0.000 0.003 n/a  0.000 0.013 ** 
           
RATIO1 Mean 0.421  0.413 0.549 **  0.418 0.570 ** 
 Median 0.385  0.385 0.538 **  0.385 0.538 ** 
           
RATIO2 Mean 0.712  0.707 0.787 **  0.710 0.800 ** 
 Median 0.714  0.714 0.800 **  0.714 0.800 ** 
           
ADR Mean 0.017  0.002 0.274 **  0.000 1.000 n/a 
 Median 0.000  0.000 0.000 **  0.000 1.000 n/a 
           
ADRTIME Mean 0.027  0.001 0.483 ** 0.000 1.621 ** 
 Median 0.000  0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 1.609 ** 
          
DSI Mean 0.523  0.504 0.856 ** 0.515 0.978 ** 
 Median 1.000  1.000 1.000 ** 0.000 1.000 ** 
          
USSALES Mean 0.011  0.009 0.031 ** 0.010 0.043 ** 
 Median 0.000  0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 ** 
           
NAL Mean 5.842  5.277 15.767 **  5.674 15.594 ** 
 Median 3.000  3.000 15.000 **  3.000 15.000 ** 
           
LMVUS Mean 5.162  5.035 7.389 **  5.120 7.561 ** 
 Median 5.183  5.081 8.062 **  5.148 8.276 ** 
           
SGR Mean 0.102  0.101 0.113 **  0.101 0.148 ** 
 Median 0.058  0.057 0.075 **  0.057 0.095 ** 
           
ROE Mean 0.084  0.083 0.112 **  0.084 0.133 ** 
 Median 0.076  0.075 0.105 **  0.075 0.124 ** 
           
DTA Mean 0.246  0.245 0.259 **  0.246 0.259 ** 
 Median 0.222  0.221 0.251 **  0.222 0.252 ** 
           
EP Mean 0.029  0.029 0.038 **  0.029 0.045 ** 
 Median 0.043  0.043 0.047 **  0.043 0.050 ** 
           
BP Mean 0.858  0.868 0.685 **  0.862 0.646 ** 
 Median 0.666  0.677 0.529 **  0.670 0.507 ** 
           
DP Mean 0.021  0.021 0.022 *  0.021 0.022 * 
 Median 0.016  0.015 0.018 **  0.015 0.019 ** 
           
RET Mean 0.070  0.067 0.123 **  0.068 0.202 ** 
 Median 0.011  0.007 0.073 **  0.009 0.146 ** 
           
BIG5 Mean 0.693  0.682 0.886 **  0.689 0.947 ** 
 Median 1.000  1.000 1.000 **  1.000 1.000 ** 
           
Number of firm-years 89,078  84,280 4,798   87,573 1,505  
Number of firms 12,934  11,952 982   12,628 306  
**, * Subsamples significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 level, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Country 
  Means Standard Deviation
 N DIH NIH PIH ADR DSI RATIO1 RATIO2 RATIO1 RATIO2
Argentina 216 0.301 11.171 0.028 0.125 0.296 0.382 0.789 0.136 0.160 
Australia 2661 0.123 1.559 0.003 0.039 0.179 0.423 0.730 0.137 0.152 
Austria 753 0.037 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.101 0.366 0.741 0.188 0.186 
Belgium 1209 0.010 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.407 0.775 0.196 0.201 
Brazil 934 0.073 0.988 0.003 0.022 0.202 0.443 0.735 0.126 0.105 
Chile 525 0.173 4.392 0.011 0.152 0.276 0.499 0.784 0.154 0.131 
China 385 0.078 0.436 0.001 0.026 0.096 0.452 0.861 0.107 0.113 
Columbia 146 0.089 0.664 0.002 0.068 0.205 0.376 0.719 0.142 0.158 
Czech 181 0.033 0.116 0.001 0.000 0.033 0.367 0.673 0.148 0.196 
Denmark 1725 0.014 0.467 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.343 0.639 0.147 0.169 
Egypt 11 0.364 0.818 0.013 0.000 0.636 0.189 0.522 0.126 0.260 
Finland 899 0.053 1.584 0.003 0.026 0.065 0.396 0.681 0.161 0.171 
France 5844 0.034 0.728 0.001 0.013 0.051 0.451 0.764 0.189 0.184 
Germany 4885 0.036 0.476 0.000 0.002 0.045 0.396 0.778 0.173 0.157 
Greece 837 0.005 0.125 0.000 0.004 0.018 0.211 0.730 0.098 0.215 
Hong Kong 2296 0.121 0.887 0.001 0.002 0.180 0.395 0.662 0.116 0.116 
Hungary 115 0.130 1.478 0.003 0.017 0.270 0.352 0.739 0.258 0.264 
India 1719 0.049 0.167 0.001 0.002 0.113 0.236 0.507 0.097 0.147 
Ireland 629 0.084 3.132 0.011 0.083 0.137 0.349 0.627 0.118 0.125 
Indonesia 702 0.017 0.479 0.000 0.010 0.026 0.482 0.848 0.157 0.130 
Israel 156 0.333 8.833 0.044 0.115 0.269 0.590 0.896 0.143 0.061 
Italy 2114 0.051 0.461 0.000 0.016 0.063 0.559 0.804 0.144 0.117 
Japan 22605 0.044 0.345 0.000 0.010 0.070 0.476 0.706 0.170 0.190 
Luxembourg 151 0.113 2.755 0.008 0.033 0.060 0.324 0.724 0.205 0.230 
Mexico 586 0.353 11.454 0.027 0.193 0.454 0.403 0.712 0.133 0.128 
Morocco 8 0.125 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.288 0.714 0.178 0.120 
Malaysia 2634 0.023 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.470 0.711 0.122 0.096 
Norway 1070 0.064 1.377 0.005 0.029 0.101 0.400 0.760 0.170 0.170 
Netherlands 1744 0.127 8.596 0.010 0.054 0.153 0.423 0.730 0.156 0.163 
New Zealand 436 0.057 1.528 0.002 0.023 0.055 0.478 0.814 0.125 0.129 
Pakistan 485 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.286 0.620 0.097 0.158 
Peru 156 0.167 4.615 0.011 0.038 0.250 0.350 0.711 0.150 0.159 
Philippines 547 0.084 1.272 0.005 0.015 0.168 0.458 0.941 0.140 0.109 
Poland 179 0.067 0.196 0.001 0.000 0.112 0.380 0.819 0.167 0.149 
Portugal 548 0.044 1.192 0.003 0.031 0.044 0.421 0.707 0.176 0.200 
Russia 39 0.333 4.179 0.016 0.103 0.333 0.201 0.614 0.207 0.393 
South Africa 1802 0.099 0.860 0.002 0.022 0.148 0.360 0.677 0.132 0.121 
South Korea 1831 0.018 0.535 0.001 0.007 0.067 0.483 0.640 0.132 0.125 
Slovakia 38 0.053 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.132 0.306 0.699 0.229 0.192 
Singapore 1468 0.037 0.373 0.002 0.000 0.069 0.475 0.719 0.133 0.103 
Spain 1467 0.051 2.607 0.002 0.014 0.059 0.429 0.734 0.168 0.175 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Country (continued) 
  Means Standard Deviation
 N DIH NIH PIH ADR DSI RATIO1 RATIO2 RATIO1 RATIO2
Sri Lanka 76 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.350 0.652 0.149 0.187 
Sweden 1532 0.061 1.751 0.003 0.031 0.081 0.311 0.719 0.166 0.188 
Switzerland 1887 0.022 0.619 0.000 0.008 0.055 0.432 0.679 0.256 0.242 
Taiwan 1018 0.041 0.337 0.000 0.009 0.116 0.576 0.935 0.104 0.103 
Thailand 1340 0.009 0.129 0.002 0.000 0.037 0.363 0.897 0.138 0.154 
Turkey 339 0.012 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.192 0.618 0.150 0.288 
U.K. 16041 0.051 1.682 0.002 0.021 0.061 0.352 0.635 0.104 0.111 
Venezuela 84 0.345 4.155 0.009 0.024 0.702 0.524 0.856 0.127 0.115 
Zimbabwe 25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.357 0.690 0.138 0.156 
      
Min 8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.189 0.507 0.097 0.061 
Max 22605 0.364 11.454 0.044 0.193 0.702 0.590 0.941 0.258 0.393 
 
Panel C: Correlation Matrix 
 LNIH PIH RATIO1 RATIO2 ADR 
ADR-
TIME DSI
US-
SALES LNAL LMVUS SGR ROE DTA EP BP DP RET BIG5
LNIH 1 0.55 0.18 0.09 0.62 0.57 0.13 0.05 0.20 0.28 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.09
PIH 0.99 1 0.08 0.05 0.31 0.26 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.04
RATIO1 0.17 0.17 1 0.70 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.09 0.33 0.31 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 0.03 0.09
RATIO2 0.10 0.10 0.69 1 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.06
ADR 0.49 0.48 0.11 0.07 1 0.80 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.07
ADRTIME 0.47 0.46 0.10 0.06 0.88 1 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.06
DSI 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.06 0.12 0.11 1 0.02 0.28 0.40 0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.06 -0.15 0.00 0.08 0.10
USSALES 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 1.00 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
LNAL 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.31 0.06 1 0.60 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.09 -0.22 0.07 0.06 0.09
LMVUS 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.42 0.06 0.62 1 0.10 0.27 -0.05 0.18 -0.37 0.04 0.22 0.17
SGR 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.14 1 0.24 0.01 0.16 -0.14 -0.02 0.18 0.00
ROE 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.21 0.27 0.30 1 -0.22 0.73 -0.33 0.29 0.31 0.01
DTA 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.20 1 -0.22 0.07 -0.12 -0.11 0.00
EP -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.67 -0.17 1 -0.11 0.45 0.22 -0.02
BP -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.14 -0.02 -0.24 -0.35 -0.19 -0.42 0.02 0.07 1 0.08 -0.32 -0.04
DP 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.26 -0.11 0.53 0.16 1 -0.02 0.00
RET 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.23 0.21 0.31 -0.11 0.12 -0.31 -0.02 1 0.00
BIG5 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 1
 
Panel A presents means and medians of all variables defined in Table 1.  The Full Sample includes all firms with 
nonmissing Worldscope data for all of the variables obtained from that source.  Any observation not found on 
Spectrum or I/B/E/S is assumed to have zero US institutional ownership or analyst following, respectively.  The 
“NIH=0” (“NIH > 0”) column represents the subsample of firms with zero (nonzero) ownership by US institutional 
investors.  The “No ADR” (“ADR”) column represents the subsample of firms without (with) an ADR listed on a 
US exchange (i.e. level II or III ADR).  The “Diff" column indicates whether the means or medians are significantly 
different from each other across the two subsamples.  The significance test is two-tailed and is based on a t-statistic 
for the means and a z-statistic for the medians.  Panel B presents the number (N) of firm-year observations from 
each country in the full sample as well as means for each of the variables listed in the top row.  Panel C presents 
correlations among the variables defined in Table 1.  Pearson (Spearman) correlations are reported above (below) 
the diagonal.  Because the full sample has 89,078 observations, all correlation coefficients greater than 0.01 in 
absolute value are significantly different from zero at or below the 0.05 level.  
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Table 3 
Regression of US Institutional Ownership on US GAAP Conformity Ratios and Control Variables 
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 Full Sample  Restricted Sample 
 DIH  LNIH  PIH  LNIH  PIH 
INTERCEPT -5.2540*** -5.2689*** 0.0417*** 0.0395*** 0.0008** 0.0008**  0.4086*** 0.4129*** 0.0270* 0.0277** 
RATIO1 1.5343***  0.1226***  0.0052***   0.9884***  0.0809***  
RATIO2  1.2216***  0.0305**  0.0032***   0.8279***  0.0798***
                    
ADR 4.2723*** 4.2863*** 1.9383*** 1.9422*** 0.0467*** 0.0468***  1.0307*** 1.0352*** 0.0366** 0.0365** 
ADRTIME 1.8593*** 1.8642*** 0.2797*** 0.2823*** 0.0011*** 0.0012***  -0.0389 -0.0319 -0.0013 -0.0005 
DSI 0.1008 0.1246 -0.0297*** -0.0278*** -0.0008*** -0.0007***  -0.4331*** -0.4332*** -0.0264** -0.0264** 
USSALES 0.3071 0.3732 0.0826** 0.0904** 0.0017 0.0020  0.1060 0.1137 0.0032 0.0035 
LNAL 0.2364*** 0.2725*** 0.0121*** 0.0152*** -0.0005* -0.0004  -0.0114 0.0059 -0.0159*** -0.0145***
LMVUS 0.7699*** 0.7803*** 0.0426*** 0.0441*** 0.0004*** 0.0005***  0.3254*** 0.3409*** -0.0053 -0.0040 
SGR -0.2945 -0.3148 -0.0160** -0.0154** 0.0015** 0.0015**  0.1138 0.1211* 0.0334*** 0.0348***
ROE 0.5691*** 0.5582*** 0.1215*** 0.1220*** 0.0059*** 0.0059***  1.6302*** 1.6795*** 0.0917*** 0.0974***
DTA 0.0051*** 0.0060*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0038*** -0.0033*** -0.0001 -0.0001 
EP -1.2943** -1.2376** -0.1653*** -0.1644*** -0.0056*** -0.0056***  -1.8081** -1.8554** -0.0387 -0.0443 
BP 0.1360 0.1312 0.0114** 0.0118** 0.0000 0.0000  0.1768 0.1943 0.0005 0.0018 
DP -1.5101 -1.9047 -0.0423 -0.0850 -0.0212*** -0.0227***  -6.3687** -6.4710** -0.5945** -0.6057** 
RET -0.4157*** -0.4191*** -0.0140** -0.0146** -0.0005** -0.0005**  -0.0494 -0.0496 -0.0047 -0.0051 
BIG5 0.5661*** 0.5864*** 0.0171*** 0.0182*** 0.0004** 0.0004**  0.0287 0.0284 0.0054 0.0053 
 
***, **, *  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (one-tailed for RATIO1 and RATIO2, two-tailed for other variables). 
 
This table presents results from regressions of US institutional ownership variables (DIH, LNIH, PIH) on US GAAP conformity ratios and control variables.  All 
variables are defined in Table 1.  All continuous variables are adjusted for the median value of the variable in the firm’s country.  Logistic (OLS) regressions are 
used when DIH (LNIH, PIH) is the dependent variable.  Regressions are estimated for each year in the sample (1989-99) and mean coefficients are reported for 
each variable.  Significance tests are based on a standard error computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.  One-tailed 
tests are used to test the significance of the hypothesized positive sign on RATIO1 and RATIO2.  Two-tailed tests are used for all of the control variables.  The 
Full Sample (89,078 observations) includes all firms with nonmissing Worldscope data for all of the variables obtained from that source.  Any observation not 
found on Spectrum or I/B/E/S is assumed to have zero US institutional ownership or analyst following, respectively.  The Restricted Sample (4,798) only 
includes firms with at least one US institutional owner. 
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Table 4 
Regression of Changes in US Institutional Ownership on Changes in US GAAP Conformity Ratios and Control Variables 
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Panel A: Continuous Change in Conformity Ratios 
 Full Sample  Restricted Sample 
 CLNIH  CPIH  CLNIH  CPIH 
INTERCEPT -0.0016 -0.0018* 0.0000 0.0000 0.2241** 0.2228** 0.0010 0.0012 
CRATIO1 0.0133**  0.0007***  0.4084  0.0119***  
CRATIO2  0.0131**  0.0005**  0.4219*  0.0091** 
         
CADR -0.0368 -0.0354 -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0377 0.0306 -0.0026 -0.0026 
ADRTIME -0.0554*** -0.0531*** -0.0005** -0.0004 -0.0435* -0.0407 -0.0004 -0.0004 
DIH 0.2945*** 0.2922*** 0.0015 0.0016     
CUSSALES -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0122 -0.0094 -0.0014 -0.0015 
CLNAL 0.0057*** 0.0059*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.1876*** 0.1956*** -0.0003 0.0013 
CLMVUS 0.0095*** 0.0100*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.2219*** 0.2293*** 0.0061*** 0.0067*** 
CSGR -0.0016 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0715 -0.0507 0.0005 0.0014 
CROE 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0004* -0.0004* 0.2499 0.2281 -0.0052* -0.0032 
CDTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001** 0.0001** 
CEP -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0005** -0.0004 -0.2060 -0.4409 -0.0129*** -0.0162*** 
CBP 0.0040** 0.0043** 0.0001 0.0001 0.1757** 0.1720** 0.0034 0.0031 
CDP -0.0331 -0.0237 0.0048** 0.0048** -2.1431 -1.5049 0.0273 0.0376 
CRET -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0217 -0.0293 -0.0043*** -0.0048*** 
CBIG5 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0165 -0.0256 -0.0006 -0.0010 
CSHARES 0.0142 0.0126 0.0003 0.0003 0.2954 0.1648 0.0167 0.0141 
 
***, **, *  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (one-tailed for CRATIO1 and CRATIO2, two-tailed for other variables). 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Regression of Changes in US Institutional Ownership on Changes in US GAAP Conformity Ratios and Control Variables 
Panel B: Piecewise Change in Conformity Ratios 
 Full Sample  Restricted Sample 
 CLNIH  CPIH  CLNIH  CPIH 
INTERCEPT -0.0019** -0.0018* 0.0000 0.0000  0.2178** 0.2169** 0.0009 0.0010 
CRATIO1+ 0.0254***  0.0008***   0.4630  0.0151***  
CRATIO1- -0.0079  0.0003   0.1483  0.0034  
CRATIO2+  0.0128**  0.0006**   0.4284*  0.0143** 
CRATIO2-  -0.0096  0.0000   0.3881  -0.0044 
                  
CADR -0.0356 -0.0340 -0.0012 -0.0012  0.0442 0.0306 -0.0025 -0.0027 
ADRTIME -0.0539*** -0.0515*** -0.0005** -0.0004  -0.0401 -0.0393 -0.0004 -0.0004 
DIH 0.2921*** 0.2897*** 0.0015 0.0016      
CUSSALES -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0004 -0.0004  -0.0122 -0.0109 -0.0014 -0.0013 
CLNAL 0.0057*** 0.0060*** 0.0000 0.0000  0.1891*** 0.1931*** -0.0003 0.0013 
CLMVUS 0.0092*** 0.0098*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***  0.2137*** 0.2249*** 0.0060*** 0.0066***
CSGR -0.0020 -0.0017 0.0000 0.0001  -0.0722 -0.0511 0.0005 0.0015 
CROE 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0004* -0.0004*  0.2550 0.2376 -0.0053* -0.0037 
CDTA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000***  0.0007 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001** 
CEP -0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0004** -0.0004  -0.1821 -0.4638 -0.0122*** -0.0155***
CBP 0.0036** 0.0038** 0.0001 0.0001  0.1784* 0.1680** 0.0036 0.0031 
CDP -0.0237 -0.0153 0.0048** 0.0048**  -2.3168 -1.4661 0.0231 0.0357 
CRET -0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0003*** -0.0003***  -0.0134 -0.0279 -0.0041*** -0.0048***
CBIG5 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001  -0.0053 -0.0185 -0.0005 -0.0010 
CSHARES 0.0139 0.0121 0.0002 0.0003  0.2916 0.1727 0.0166 0.0142 
***, **, *  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (one-tailed for CRATIO1 and CRATIO2, two-tailed for other variables). 
 
This table presents results from regressions of changes in US institutional ownership variables (CLNIH, CPIH) on changes in US GAAP conformity ratios and 
control variables.  All variables (except DIH) are one-year changes in the variables defined in Table 1.  CRATIO+ (CRATIO-) equals CRATIO if it is positive 
(nonpositive) and zero otherwise.  All continuous variables are adjusted for the median value of the variable in the firm’s country.  Regressions are estimated for 
each year in the sample (1989-99) and mean coefficients are reported for each variable.  Significance tests are based on a standard error computed from the 
distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.  One-tailed tests are used to test the significance of the hypothesized positive sign on CRATIO1 
and CRATIO2.  Two-tailed tests are used for all of the control variables.  The Full Sample (79,644 observations) includes all firms with nonmissing Worldscope 
data for all of the variables obtained from that source.  Any observation not found on Spectrum or I/B/E/S is assumed to have zero US institutional ownership or 
analyst following, respectively.  The Restricted Sample (4,616 observations) only includes firms with at least one US institutional owner. 
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Table 5 
Lead-Lag Regressions of Changes in US Institutional Ownership on Changes in US GAAP Conformity Ratios and Control Variables 
Panel A: Future Changes in Institutional Ownership  Panel B: Future Changes in Conformity Ratios 
 FCLNIH  FCPIH   FCRATIO1  FCRATIO2 
INTERCEPT 0.0075*** 0.0078*** 0.0000 0.0000 INTERCEPT 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 
CRATIO1+ 0.0289**  0.0016**  CLNIH+ -0.0006  0.0024  
CRATIO1- -0.0949  -0.0037  CLNIH- 0.0035  0.0043  
CRATIO2+  0.0188**  0.0013** CPIH+  -0.1752  -0.1573 
CRATIO2-  -0.0228  -0.0001 CPIH-  -0.0711  0.0646 
  
CADR 0.1841 0.1843 0.0067 0.0067 CADR 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0015 -0.0020 
ADRTIME 0.0388*** 0.0389*** 0.0001 0.0001 ADRTIME 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0009 
DIH -0.0241 -0.0238 0.0000 0.0000 DIH -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0035 -0.0022 
CUSSALES -0.0016 -0.0016 0.0003 0.0003 CUSSALES -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0033** -0.0035** 
CLNAL 0.0071* 0.0072* 0.0000 0.0000 CLNAL 0.0024 0.0023 0.0016 0.0017 
CLMVUS 0.0044 0.0044 0.0002 0.0002 CLMVUS 0.0035** 0.0036** -0.0001 -0.0001 
CSGR 0.0021 0.0021 -0.0001 -0.0001 CSGR 0.0000 0.0001 0.0011 0.0011 
CROE 0.0210* 0.0206* 0.0003 0.0003 CROE 0.0046 0.0046 0.0072 0.0071 
CDTA 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 CDTA 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 
CEP -0.0182 -0.0176 0.0005 0.0005 CEP 0.0080** 0.0081** 0.0077 0.0079 
CBP -0.0083*** -0.0083*** -0.0002 -0.0002 CBP -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0029 -0.0029 
CDP -0.0376 -0.0372 -0.0007 -0.0007 CDP 0.0184 0.0179 -0.0372* -0.0383* 
CRET -0.0043* -0.0044* 0.0000 0.0000 CRET -0.0018** -0.0017** -0.0002 -0.0002 
CBIG5 0.0014 0.0016 0.0005** 0.0005** CBIG5 0.0043** 0.0043** 0.0028 0.0028 
CSHARES -0.0198 -0.0203 -0.0004 -0.0004 CSHARES 0.0003 0.0004 0.0121** 0.0121** 
***, **, *  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (one-tailed for CRATIO1 and CRATIO2, two-tailed for other variables). 
 
Panel A of the table presents results from regressions of one-year-ahead future changes in US institutional ownership variables (FCLNIH, FCPIH) on prior one-
year changes in US GAAP conformity ratios and control variables.  Panel B of the table presents results from regressions of one-year ahead future changes in US 
GAAP conformity ratios (FCRATIO1, FCRATIO2) on prior one-year changes in US institutional ownership and control variables.  All variables are one-year 
changes in the variables defined in Table 1.  CRATIO+ (CRATIO-) equals CRATIO if it is positive (nonpositive) and zero otherwise.  All continuous variables 
are adjusted for the median value of the variable in the firm’s country.  Regressions are estimated for each year in the sample (1989-99) and mean coefficients are 
reported for each variable.  Significance tests are based on a standard error computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.  
One-tailed tests are used to test the significance of the hypothesized positive sign on CRATIO1 and CRATIO2 variables.  Two-tailed tests are used for all of the 
control variables.  The regressions are estimated for the Full Sample (67,264 observations), which includes all firms with nonmissing Worldscope data for all of 
the variables obtained from that source. 
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Table 6 
Industry-adjusted Regressions of US Institutional Ownership on US GAAP Conformity Ratios and Control Variables in Full Sample 
 Levels (Tbl. 3)   Contemporary Changes (Tbl. 4)  Lead-Lag Changes (Tbl. 5) 
 LNIH PIH   CLNIH CPIH  FCLNIH FCPIH 
INTERCEPT 0.0424*** 0.0006**  INTERCEPT -0.0026* 0.0000 0.0072*** 0.0000 
RATIO1 0.0664*** 0.0029**  CRATIO1+ 0.0289*** 0.0009*** 0.0291*** 0.0017*** 
ADR 1.8930*** 0.0438***  CRATIO1- -0.0169 -0.0001 -0.0348 -0.0015 
ADRTIME 0.5773*** 0.0043***  CADR -0.0375 -0.0012 0.1812 0.0067 
DSI -0.0353*** -0.0008***  ADRTIME -0.0543*** -0.0005** 0.0391*** 0.0001 
USSALES 0.0789** 0.0018  DIH 0.2926*** 0.0015 -0.0246 0.0000 
LNAL 0.0243*** -0.0002  CUSSALES -0.0016 -0.0004 -0.0018 0.0003 
LMVUS 0.0339*** 0.0003**  CLNAL 0.0069** 0.0000 0.0101*** 0.0001** 
SGR 0.0004 0.0018*  CLMVUS 0.0105*** 0.0003*** 0.0084* 0.0002 
ROE 0.1535*** 0.0065***  CSGR -0.0032 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0001 
DTA -0.0001 0.0000  CROE -0.0012 -0.0004* 0.0200* 0.0003 
EP -0.2104*** -0.0059***  CDTA 0.0001 0.0000** 0.0001 0.0000 
BP 0.0255*** 0.0005**  CEP -0.0043 -0.0004* -0.0221 0.0004 
DP 0.5473*** -0.0133**  CBP 0.0047*** 0.0001 -0.0049 -0.0002 
RET 0.0009 0.0000  CDP -0.0115 0.0037** -0.0145 -0.0007 
BIG5 0.0108*** 0.0004***  CRET -0.0019 -0.0003*** -0.0046** 0.0001 
    CBIG5 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0013 0.0005** 
    CSHARES 0.0119 0.0002 -0.0224 -0.0004 
         
RATIO2 0.0381* 0.0046**  CRATIO2+ 0.0137** 0.0007*** 0.0168* 0.0011** 
    CRATIO2- -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0175 -0.0002 
***, **, *  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (one-tailed for RATIO variables, two-tailed for other variables). 
 
This table presents results from regressions of US institutional ownership variables on US GAAP conformity ratios and control variables with all continuous 
variables adjusted for the median value of the variable in the firm’s industry, defined with 2-digit SIC codes.  No adjustment is made for the firm’s country.  
LNIH, CLNIH, and FCLNIH (PIH, CPIH, FCPIH) are the level, one-year change, and future one-year change in the log number of institutional investors 
(percent of institutional ownership), respectively.  All variables are defined in Table 1, and all variables starting with “C” are one-year changes in the variables.  
CRATIO+ (CRATIO-) equals CRATIO if it is positive (nonpositive) and zero otherwise.  Regressions are estimated for each year in the sample (1989-99) and 
mean coefficients are reported for each variable.  Significance tests are based on a standard error computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted 
for serial correlation.  One-tailed tests are used to test the significance of the hypothesized positive sign on RATIO1, RATIO2, and the CRATIO variables.  Two-
tailed tests are used for all of the control variables.  The Full Sample includes all firms with nonmissing Worldscope data for all of the variables obtained from 
that source.  Any observation not found on Spectrum or I/B/E/S is assumed to have zero US institutional ownership or analyst following, respectively.  The 
sample sizes are as follows: 89,078 observations in the levels test, 79,644 observations in the contemporaneous changes test, and 67,264 observations in the lead-
lag changes test. 
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Table 7 
Regressions of US Institutional Ownership on US GAAP Conformity Ratios and Control Variables in Firm Visibility Subsamples 
 Panel A: Partition based on ADR listing  Panel B: Partition based on Stock Index membership 
 LNIH PIH  LNIH PIH 
 ADR NO ADR DIFF ADR NO ADR DIFF  INDEX NO INDEX DIFF INDEX NO INDEX DIFF
INTERCEPT 2.5083** 0.0484*** ** 0.1886* 0.0007*** *  -0.0133*** 0.0440*** *** 0.0001 0.0008** *** 
RATIO1 2.1342*** 0.1453*** *** 0.1165*** 0.0036*** ***  0.1744*** 0.0761*** *** 0.0073*** 0.0034** *** 
ADR        1.8780*** 2.0624**  0.0428*** 0.1873*  
ARDTIME        0.5872*** 0.2823*** *** 0.0038*** 0.0016**  
DSI -1.0687* -0.0125*** * -0.1499* -0.0005*** *        
USSALES 0.1148 0.0981**  0.0022 0.0020   0.0775** 0.1099  0.0010 0.0035  
LNAL -0.0849 0.0161***  -0.0204*** -0.0003* ***  0.0107*** 0.0099***  -0.0007*** -0.0005  
LMVUS 0.3209*** 0.0489*** *** 0.0063 0.0005***   0.0559*** 0.0308*** ** 0.0004* 0.0005***  
SGR -0.3970* -0.0249*** * 0.0427* 0.0004** *  -0.0182 -0.0189**  0.0020** 0.0007  
ROE 1.8309** 0.0597*** ** 0.1435** 0.0029*** **  0.1018*** 0.1326***  0.0070*** 0.0039*** *** 
DTA -0.0127** 0.0005*** ** -0.0001 0.0000   0.0003*** 0.0002  0.0000 0.0000  
EP -1.7337* -0.1104*** * -0.1452** -0.0029*** **  -0.1843*** -0.1469***  -0.0099*** -0.0024* ** 
BP 0.1132 0.0152***  -0.0027 0.0001   0.0197** 0.0050* * 0.0000 0.0000  
DP 2.4292 -0.1382  -0.7696* -0.0093*** *  0.2220 -0.2545**  -0.0199* -0.0191***  
RET -0.2746* -0.0166*** * -0.0150* -0.0004* *  -0.0112 -0.0178**  -0.0005 -0.0004  
BIG5 0.0270 0.0188***  -0.0105 0.0005***   0.0333*** 0.0077*** *** 0.0003* 0.0004**  
              
RATIO2 1.6275** 0.0567** ** 0.1004*** 0.0027*** ***  0.0554** 0.0270** ** 0.0037*** 0.0031**  
 
***, **, *  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (one-tailed for RATIO1 and RATIO2, two-tailed for other variables). 
 
  55
Table 7 (continued) 
Regressions of US Institutional Ownership on US GAAP Conformity Ratios and Control Variables in Firm Visibility Subsamples 
 Panel C: Partition based on Analyst Following  Panel D: Partition based on Firm Size 
 LNIH PIH  LNIH PIH 
 HIGH LOW DIFF HIGH LOW DIFF  LARGE SMALL DIFF LARGE SMALL DIFF
INTERCEPT 0.0827 0.0208***  0.0070 0.0006***   -0.1836 0.0167***  0.0018 0.0006***  
RATIO1 0.6872*** 0.0566*** *** 0.0218*** 0.0035*** ***  0.7211*** 0.0329*** *** 0.0301** 0.0029*** ** 
ADR 1.9335*** 1.6858*** ** 0.0458*** 0.0463***   1.8431*** 1.6438*** *** 0.0354*** 0.0594*** *** 
ARDTIME 0.3572*** 0.2325*** ** 0.0011 0.0010***   0.2573*** 0.2401***  -0.0002 0.0037*** * 
DSI -0.1559* -0.0096*** * -0.0034** -0.0006** **  -0.1189 -0.0082***  -0.0022 -0.0007***  
USSALES 0.1731 0.0371**  0.0000 0.0024   0.3132** 0.0270 ** 0.0057 0.0006  
LNAL -0.0846*** -0.0033 *** -0.0041*** -0.0006* ***  0.0758*** 0.0023** *** -0.0039 -0.0003***  
LMVUS 0.1763*** 0.0207*** *** 0.0015* 0.0002*   0.1357* 0.0138***  0.0015 0.0002***  
SGR -0.0701 0.0023  0.0030 0.0015*   -0.0718 0.0040  0.0051 0.0012***  
ROE 1.0002*** 0.0127 *** 0.0413*** 0.0023* ***  1.6001*** 0.0162*** *** 0.0507*** 0.0029*** *** 
DTA 0.0005 0.0002***  0.0000 0.0000   -0.0004 0.0002***  0.0000 0.0000  
EP -1.3448*** -0.0383*** *** -0.0478*** -0.0019 ***  -1.7945*** -0.0439*** *** -0.0788*** -0.0020*** *** 
BP 0.0897 0.0008  0.0033*** -0.0002 ***  0.0039 0.0005  -0.0020 0.0000  
DP 1.4641 -0.0657  -0.0465*** -0.0167*** **  5.2194** -0.0842 ** 0.0233 -0.0186***  
RET -0.0219 -0.0129***  -0.0005 -0.0005   -0.0622 -0.0142***  -0.0022* -0.0004*  
BIG5 0.0526** 0.0106*** * -0.0007 0.0003*   0.1455*** 0.0103*** *** -0.0003 0.0004*  
              
RATIO2 0.3525** 0.0299*** ** 0.0178*** 0.0025*** ***  0.3207*** 0.0180*** *** 0.0199** 0.0023*** ** 
***, **, *  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (one-tailed for RATIO1 and RATIO2, two-tailed for other variables). 
 
This table presents results from regressions of US institutional ownership variables (LNIH, PIH) on US GAAP conformity ratios and control variables.  All 
variables are defined in Table 1.  All continuous variables are adjusted for the median value of the variable in the firm’s country.  Regressions are estimated for 
each year in the sample (1989-99) and mean coefficients are reported for each variable.  Significance tests are based on a standard error computed from the 
distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.  One-tailed tests are used to test the significance of the hypothesized positive sign on RATIO1 
and RATIO2.  Two-tailed tests are used for all of the control variables.   The “DIFF” column presents tests of significant differences between coefficients across 
the two subsamples, based on the distribution of coefficients from yearly SUR regressions.  Only the coefficients on the RATIO2 variable are reported for 
regressions using that variable; coefficients on all other variables are similar to the reported RATIO1 specification.  All regressions are estimated on the Full 
Sample, which includes all firms with nonmissing Worldscope data for all of the variables obtained from that source.  Panel A partitions the sample based on 
firms with exchange-listed ADRs (1505 observations, 306 firms) and firms without such ADRs (87,573 obs, 12,628 firms).  Panel B partitions the sample based 
on firms listed on a stock index (46,601 obs, 6,612 firms) and firms not listed (42,477 obs, 6,322 firms).   Panel C partitions the sample based on firms with high 
analyst following (top decile in each year) (9,385 obs., 2,072 firms) and all other firms (79,693 obs., 12,474 firms).  Panel D partitions the sample based on large 
firms (top decile in each year) (7,336 obs., 1,420 firms) and all other firms (81,742 obs., 12,445 firms).   
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Table 8 
Regressions of Number of US Institutional Investors on US GAAP Conformity Ratios and Control Variables in Country Subsamples 
 Country Legal Tradition Country Mean CIFAR Score  Country Variance of RATIO1  Country Earnings Management
 Code Law Common Law DIFF HIGH LOW DIFF  HIGH LOW DIFF  HIGH LOW DIFF
INTERCEPT 0.0298*** 0.0677*** ***  0.0743*** 0.0314*** ***  0.0332*** 0.0617*** ***  0.0291*** 0.0858*** ** 
RATIO1 0.1315*** 0.1472***   0.2268*** 0.0951*** ***  0.1402*** 0.1119**   0.0997*** 0.2275*** *** 
ADR 2.0631*** 1.6783*** ***  1.7626*** 2.1707*** ***  2.0500*** 1.6593*** **  2.0005*** 1.7989*** * 
ARDTIME 0.2624*** 0.3359***   0.4046*** 0.2550*** **  0.2482*** 0.3955*** **  0.2682*** 0.4196***  
DSI -0.0189** -0.0474*** ***  -0.0399** -0.0222***   -0.0215** -0.0457*** **  -0.0252*** -0.0443**  
USSALES 0.0723* 0.0759   0.0269 0.2316* **  0.0840* 0.0388   0.0895** 0.0433  
LNAL 0.0121*** 0.0083**   0.0078*** 0.0116***   0.0101*** 0.0123**   0.0148*** 0.0119**  
LMVUS 0.0336*** 0.0577*** ***  0.0580*** 0.0291*** ***  0.0364*** 0.0539*** ***  0.0345*** 0.0545*** *** 
SGR -0.0010 -0.0361** **  -0.0205** -0.0039   -0.0086 -0.0227*   -0.0156*** -0.0340***  
ROE 0.0336 0.1771*** ***  0.1723*** 0.0149 ***  0.0606 0.1471***   0.0555* 0.1595*** *** 
DTA 0.0000** 0.0010*** ***  0.0006*** 0.0002*** *  0.0001 0.0009*** **  0.0000 0.0012*** *** 
EP -0.0862 -0.1953***   -0.2111*** -0.0616* **  -0.1087** -0.1770***   -0.0673** -0.1982*** ** 
BP 0.0156** 0.0006 **  0.0012 0.0135*   0.0192*** -0.0062* ***  0.0113** 0.0089***  
DP 0.2394* -0.4121 ***  -0.4872* 0.5199** ***  0.1607 -0.3044 **  0.0909 -0.5217*** *** 
RET -0.0041 -0.0314**   -0.0270** -0.0055 **  -0.0029 -0.0310**   -0.0008 -0.0282** ** 
BIG5 0.0210*** 0.0020 ***  0.0015 0.0197*** **  0.0223*** 0.0019 ***  0.0220*** -0.0176*** *** 
   
 
        
RATIO2 0.0224** 0.0799** *  0.1036** 0.0172** *  0.0281* 0.0733**   0.0155* 0.0719*** ** 
***, **, *  Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively (one-tailed for RATIO1 and RATIO2, two-tailed for other variables). 
 
This table presents results from regressions of the log number of US institutional investors (LNIH) on US GAAP conformity ratios and control variables.  All 
variables are defined in Table 1.  All continuous variables are adjusted for the median value of the variable in the firm’s country.  Regressions are estimated for 
each year in the sample (1989-99) and mean coefficients are reported for each variable.  Significance tests are based on a standard error computed from the 
distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.  One-tailed tests are used to test the significance of the hypothesized positive sign on RATIO1 
and RATIO2.  Two-tailed tests are used for all of the control variables.   The “DIFF” column presents tests of significant differences between coefficients across 
the two subsamples, based on the distribution of coefficients from yearly SUR regressions.  Only the coefficients on the RATIO2 variable are reported for 
regressions using that variable; coefficients on all other variables are similar to the reported RATIO1 specification.  All regressions are estimated on the Full 
Sample, which includes all firms with nonmissing Worldscope data for all of the variables obtained from that source.  Panel A partitions the sample based on 
firms in code law countries (57,310 obs., 8,073 firms) and firms in common law countries (31,768 obs., 4,861 firms), using the La Porta [1998] classification.  
Panel B partitions the sample based on firms in countries with high mean CIFAR disclosure scores (42,452 obs., 6,815 firms) and firms in countries with low 
mean CIFAR disclosure scores (35,366 obs., 5,967 firms), using the 1993-95 average scores in Hope [2003b].   Panel C partitions the sample based on firms in 
countries with a high standard deviation of RATIO1 (46,062 obs., 8,091 firms) and firms in countries with a low standard deviation of RATIO1 (43,016 obs., 
10,046 firms).   Panel D partitions the sample based on the median country-level aggregate earnings management score reported in Leuz, et al. [2003].  The 
HIGH (LOW) partition has 46,679 obs. and 6,397 firms (37,613 obs, 5,430 firms); the sample for this test is smaller because the Leuz, et al. score in not 
available for all countries.  
